Investor-Voters and Electoral Volatility in Sub-Saharan Africa by Asingo, Patrick Odhiambo
INVESTOR-VOTERS AND ELECTORAL VOLATILITY                                




Patrick Odhiambo Asingo 
 
Submitted to the Department of Political Science and the  
Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Kansas 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts 
 
___________________________________ 
                                                        Chairperson    
Erik S. Herron, Associate Professor of Political Science 
 
                                                    ____________________________________ 
                                                        Committee Member 
                         Ronald A. Francisco, Professor of Political Science 
 
                                                       _____________________________________ 
                                                                                Committee Member 
                     Hannah E. Britton, Associate Professor of Political Science 
 
                           




The Thesis Committee for Patrick Odhiambo Asingo certifies that this is 
the approved version of the following thesis: 
 
INVESTOR-VOTERS AND ELECTORAL VOLATILITY                                        
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
___________________________________ 
                                                        Chairperson    
Erik S. Herron, Associate Professor of political Science 
 
                                                     ___________________________ 
                                                                   Committee Members 
                         Ronald A. Francisco, Professor of political Science 
 
                                                       __________________________ 
                                                                 Committee Members 
                     Hannah E. Britton, Associate Professor of political Science 
 
 








I wish to register my appreciation to Professor Erik S. Herron for his patience, wise 
counsel and constructive criticism throughout the process of preparing this thesis. I 
also wish to thank Professor Ronald A. Francisco and Professor Hannah E. Britton 
for accepting to serve in my committee, and for their valuable feedback.  
Similarly, I thank my dear wife, Judith, and lovely sons, Alvin, Clinton and Griffin 
for their constant support and encouragement. I am equally grateful to my parents, 
Wilfred and Jenipher Asingo, for the firm foundation and their countless sacrifices. 
Finally, I thank the Fulbright Committee for awarding me the Fulbright scholarship 







TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... 3 
LIST OF ACRONYMS ................................................................................................ 6 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. 7 
 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 8 
 
CHAPTER II: RESEARCH QUESTION, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 22 
2.1 Study Puzzle and Research Question .................................................................... 22 
2.2 Study Objectives and Rationale ............................................................................ 25 
2.3 Study Limitations .................................................................................................. 28 
2.4 Theoretical Framework ......................................................................................... 31 
i. Social Cleavages and Ethnic Voting Theory ................................................... 31 
ii. Economic Voting Theories ............................................................................. 33 
iii. The Investor-Voter Model ............................................................................. 36 
2.5 Research Methodology ......................................................................................... 42 
i. Research Hypotheses ....................................................................................... 42 
ii. Key Dependent Variable: Electoral Volatility ................................................ 43 
iii. Key Independent Variable: Voters’ Living Conditions ................................. 55 
2.6 Data Collection and Analysis Methods................................................................. 59 
 
CHAPTER III: CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF VOLATILITY IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA ................................................................................................ 67 
3.1 An Overview of Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa ................................................ 67 
3.2 Model Estimation and Results .............................................................................. 69 
3.3 Aggregate Living Conditions and Electoral Volatility ......................................... 71 
3.4 Living Conditions, Political Freedoms and Electoral Volatility ........................... 76 
3.5 Living Conditions, Electoral Systems and Electoral Volatility ............................ 83 
3.6 ‘Coat Tail Effect’ and Electoral Volatility ............................................................ 85 
3.7 Ethnic Fragmentation and Electoral Volatility ..................................................... 86 
3.8 Voter Turnout and Electoral Volatility ................................................................. 88 
3.9 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 88 
5 
 
CHAPTER IV: CASE STUDY OF ELECTORAL VOLATILITY IN KENYA 89 
4.1 An Overview of Elections in Kenya ..................................................................... 89 
4.2 Provincial Level Data Analysis and Discussion ................................................... 90 
4.3 Constituency Level Analysis ................................................................................ 93 
4.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 95 
 
CHAPTER V: CASE STUDY OF VOLATILITY IN SOUTH AFRICA ........... 96 
5.1 South Africa’s Electoral System ........................................................................... 96 
5.2 Data Analysis ........................................................................................................ 97 
5.3 Study Findings ...................................................................................................... 99 
5.4 South African Puzzle: A Protest by the Rich? .................................................... 101 
5.5 Unlocking the South African Puzzle: The Case of Western Cape Province ...... 104 
5.6 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 111 
 
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTION .. 112 
6.1 Integrating Key Study Findings .......................................................................... 112 
6.2 Implications of the Findings for the Investor-Voter Model ................................ 115 
6.3 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 116 
6.4 Directions for Future Research ........................................................................... 117 
 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 119 
 
Appendix 1 Data on Selected Municipalities in Western Cape Province ................. 132 
Appendix 2: Data on Sub-Saharan Africa ................................................................ 133 
Appendix 3: Data on Kenyan Provinces ................................................................... 135 
Appendix 4: Data on South African Provinces ......................................................... 136 
Appendix 5: Data on Selected Kenyan Constituencies ............................................. 137 





LIST OF ACRONYMS  
ANC       African National Congress  
BBC        British Broadcasting Corporation 
BCP         Basotho Congress Party  
BCP         Botswana Congress Party 
BDP         Botswana Democratic Party  
BNF         Botswana National Front  
CDF         Constituency Development Funds 
DA           Democratic Alliance 
DP            Democratic Party  
ELF          Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization Index  
FDI          Foreign Direct Investment  
FPTP        First-Past-the-Post 
GDP         Gross Domestic Product 
HDI          Human Development Index  
KANU     Kenya African National Union  
LCD         Lesotho Congress for Democracy  
MCP        Malawi Congress Party  
MLPC      Movement for the Liberation of Central African People  
MMD       Movement for Multiparty Democracy  
NARC      National Rainbow Coalition 
NDC        National Democratic Congress  
NNP         New National Party  
UDF         United Democratic Front   




Do living conditions influence electoral volatility in Sub-Saharan Africa? This 
research question is informed by the tendency of free and fair elections to 
redistribute votes and seats among political parties. The redistribution is a zero sum 
game, whereby seats/votes gained by a party/ candidate, are simultaneously lost or 
‘deserted’ by another party/candidate. The study focuses on 30 Sub-Saharan 
African countries, backed by case studies of Kenya and South Africa. Using the 
investor-voter model, a refined measure of electoral volatility, and a variety of 
statistical methods, the study finds support for the hypothesis that: better living 
conditions are correlated with low volatility. Although South African provincial 
aggregate living conditions appeared puzzlingly correlated with high volatility, this 
turned out to be an artifact of some underlying strategic shifts among anti-ANC 
voters from NNP to DA. Since the shifts are driven by economic voting, the 















CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Most scholars of electoral politics regard elections as ‘the institutionalized means of 
mass political participation’ (Chua 2007:6), and a ‘basic means by which the people 
of a democracy bend government to their wishes’ (Key 1961:458). Free and fair 
elections tend to reallocate legislative seats among political parties. If everything 
else is held constant, the reallocation process is a zero sum game in which the votes 
or seats gained by a party (or independent candidate) are simultaneously lost or 
‘deserted’ by another party or candidate. It is reasonable, therefore, to expect that 
party legislative strengths and the composition of the elected members of the 
legislature will most likely change after elections. In other words, free and fair 
elections leads to electoral volatility, which can be defined as the total trade-off of 
votes or seats among political parties in successive elections.  
However, the rate at which parties gain or lose seats and votes in two successive 
elections varies across space and time. Evidence suggests that the new and emerging 
democracies tend to record higher electoral volatility than the older and established 
democracies of Europe and North America (Ishiyama, 2006). In this regard, Epperly 
(2008) notes that the post-communist states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union tend to experience higher volatility than Latin America and Western Europe. 
Other studies have shown that on average, electoral volatility tends to be higher in 
Latin America than in Europe. Even within Latin America, electoral volatility tends 
to be higher in Argentina, Brazil and Peru, but relatively lower in Colombia and 
Uruguay (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Tulchin and Garland, 1998:104-105).   
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In principle, extremely high or low volatility can be problematic (Ishiyama, 2006). 
Past studies have shown that high volatility impedes party institutionalization, raises 
political uncertainties, and makes it difficult for voters to hold leaders accountable 
(Birch, 2001). According to Fowler and Smirnov (2007) high volatility tends to 
create uncertainty about ‘the true location of the median voter’, and hence influence 
policy choices made by political parties. In essence, when volatility is very high, 
‘democratic politics is more erratic, establishing legitimacy is more difficult, and 
governing more complicated’ (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995:22).  
On the other hand, low volatility is harmful if it permanently blocks some groups in 
the society from accessing power (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999). One can also argue 
that in the new and emerging democracies, low volatility can raise doubt about the 
quality of the elections. Understanding variations in party support in different 
elections is therefore vital since volatility ‘raises stakes in the political game’, and 
influences parties’ electoral strategies (Birch, 2001; Bartolini and Mair, 1990). 
The challenge then is how to account for the variation in electoral volatility across 
space and time. Madrid (2005) as well as Thames et al (2008) notes that attempts to 
explain causes of volatility have tended to converge on three broad explanatory 
variables - political institutions, socio-political cleavages, and economic conditions. 
Thames et al (2008) condense these into demand and supply variables. The Demand 
variables refer to factors that stimulate voter desire to shift party preferences. They 
can also be understood as the propensity of voters to shift party loyalty. The Supply 
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variables refer to factors that widen the range of options available for voters who 
desire to shift party preference. They conclude that the party system, which is a 
supply variable, has the most significant direct impact on volatility and that other 
variables including voter behavior are important only to the extent that they shape 
party systems. In short, supply and not demand drives electoral volatility.   
Tavits (2008) raises the same question about whether it is voters’ proclivity to shift 
party preferences that motivate elites to change the supply of parties, or the unsteady 
supply of parties that induces voters to shift party preferences. She concludes that 
electoral volatility results from changes in the supply of parties. According to her, it 
is the elite as opposed to what she calls “erratic behavior of voters”, which accounts 
for party system instability, especially in emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. 
More specifically, the failure of the elite to build strong parties and offer clear 
choices to voters denies voters the opportunity to vote consistently, since they face a 
significantly different set of choices at each election (Tavits, 2008).  
I sum up these arguments as institution-centered approaches to electoral volatility. 
The approach is characterized by the tendency to downplay the role of voters, and 
treat electoral volatility as if it is purely a product of elite institutional engineering, 
especially changes in the electoral system. The underlying idea is that only electoral 
institutions matters and anything else, including voters, only matters to the extent 
that it can influence electoral institutions. While institutional approaches have 
contributed much to our understanding of electoral volatility, the role of the voter 
11 
 
deserves greater attention. It is true, for example, that the entry of a new party can 
substantially alter the political landscape and cause high volatility as argued by 
Tavits (2008). However, it is also true that the formation of new parties does not in 
itself constitute a sufficient ground for voters to abandon the parties they previously 
supported. I argue in this paper that there must be reasons beyond the mere presence 
of new parties for voters to shift support from an old to a new party. Voters must be 
dissatisfied with either the performance of the ruling party or the inability of the 
existing opposition parties to offer credible alternatives to the ruling party. In 
addition, voters need to believe that the new party can make a difference. This 
follows the argument that, ‘voters prefer parties which are large enough to have a 
good chance of putting their policies into effect’ (Brug et al, 2007:119).  
Interestingly, Tavits (2004) suggests that voters’ decision to support new parties is 
an expression of their disappointment with the existing alternatives, and that a vote 
for a new party is essentially a vote against the existing parties. However, beyond 
the protest vote, voters may shift preferences if they believe there are real prospects 
that the new party can indeed make a difference. According to Ersson and Lane, 
1998), shifting support from one party to another is a conscious and intentional act 
and ‘the reason for a change in voting behavior must be either that the voter 
distances him-or herself from previously held beliefs or acquires new beliefs as well 




There are two other interrelated points worth noting. First, even when voters are 
dissatisfied with the parties they have supported in the past, it is not necessarily the 
case that they will always support new parties. If the national elites misread the 
public mood and create parties that are out of sync with voter expectations, voters 
can shift to already existing parties or remain politically active but unaffiliated to 
any party. Indeed, they can remain in their old parties, or become apolitical. As I 
will explain, Malawi’s 2004 elections illustrate the point that voter dissatisfaction 
with the established parties did not translate into support for new parties. Instead 
voters elected several independent candidates into the national legislature. 
Second, I argue that elites are unlikely to voluntarily disband an existing popular 
party to create new parties unless voters show signs of displeasure with that party. 
In other words, political parties only voluntarily cease to exist when their support 
base substantially shrinks. Indeed, Powell and Tucker (2008) note that: 
New parties enter when they think they can win; old parties disappear 
when they are abandoned by elites who no longer believe they can 
win… if elites are completely certain that voters will all support 
existing parties, then there is no incentive for new party entry1
 
 
However, some scholars seem to suggest that voters have little or no influence on 
party formation. For example, Hug (2001) states that new parties emerge out of 
interactions between old parties and the forces that create new ones. This implies 
that the factors that give rise to new parties are embedded in the party system itself 
                                                 
1 Powell and Tucker, 2008. Page 7. 
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and hence the emergence of new parties is a systemic institutional issue that has 
little to do with voter behavior.  
However, evidence suggests that voters can influence party formation. For example, 
it has been noted that voter attitudes in Canada tends to be the driving force behind 
party system change. Scholars of Canadian politics observe that, ‘public discontent 
and unrests in the 20th century sparked the formation of new parties as well as 
changes in the internal practices of the existing parties’ (Carty et al, 2000:108). 
Similarly, it has been noted that the political elites had little to do with the behavior 
change among Israeli voters that led to the emergence of the Likud party. It is 
argued that the Likud party emerged to absorb the disappointed supporters of the 
Labor Party (Shapiro and Mandel, 1991; Lechery, 1997). In essence, voter 
disaffection with the existing political institutions, including the party system, 
creates demand for new parties. Political elites supply new parties in response to this 
demand, thus raising electoral volatility. 
Further counter arguments and empirical evidence from Africa also weakens Tavits 
(2008) explanation. Evidence suggests that it is not easy for a new party with a set 
of political newcomers to penetrate the African political market. Most of the so- 
called new parties either take the form of mergers or splits in existing parties, or are 
formed by elites who have fallen out of favor with the ruling class. In a number of 
cases, “party newness” is mostly symbolic. While they might have fancy names and 
catchy slogans, the policies and actors are essentially the same (see Bogaards, 
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2008). Voters are aware of these cosmetic changes and it is not surprising that new 
parties in Africa rarely offset existing party-seat distributions in any major way.  
In Botswana, the vice president of the opposition, Botswana National Front (BNF) 
led eleven of the thirteen party MPs in a split that saw them form Botswana 
Congress Party (BCP) in April 1998. However, in the 1999 elections, only one of 
the eleven MPs from the BCP was reelected and the party simply failed to create an 
impact (Ndegwa, 2001). In Zambia, several new parties emerged from splits in the 
ruling party-Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), but ‘none of the parties 
formed by politicians who have broken away from the MMD have made much 
impression at the polls’ (Localizada, 2002:1147). Likewise, in Kenya, ‘new parties 
have had little or no impact upon the elections’ (Cowen and Laakso, 2002:149).  
This study is more focused on the aspects of electoral volatility that result from 
changes in voter behavior. To capture this, I use a refined measurement of electoral 
volatility and control for institutional influences on the electoral process. I advance 
the argument that the primary causal drivers of electoral volatility are voters and not 
institutions. In other words, voters are not passive clients or consumers of the elite 
institutional designs. As one scholar puts it, ‘voters are not lumps of clay waiting to 
be molded’ (Willet 1988:372). That is, voters do not just approve elite decisions, but 




Cases where voters reject elite consensus are not in short supply. A good example is 
the 1992 Canadian Charlottetown Accord on constitutional change, which received 
the support of nearly the entire Canadian political elite. It was backed by the three 
key parties- Conservatives, Liberals, and Democrats-and the premiers of all the ten 
provinces. The main critic of the accord was the Reform Party, which had only one 
seat in the 257-seat House of Commons. Despite the huge elite support, the accord 
was rejected by voters in the referendum (Ginsberg and Stone, 1996; Norris, 1997).   
Even after rejecting the accord, the Canadian voters were not done with the elites. In 
the autumn 1993 ‘electoral earthquake’, they voted in a way that redistributed seats 
among parties in an unparalleled manner. The ruling Conservative party, which had 
160 majority seats, won only 2 seats with 16% of the popular vote. At the same time, 
the Democrats who had 44 seats won only 9 seats with 7% of the popular vote. On the 
other hand, the Reform Party, which did not win any seats in 1988 and only got one 
seat through a by-election, was handsomely rewarded with 52 seats in 1993 (Ginsberg 
and Stone, 1996; Norris, 1997).  In short, voters not only rejected the elites’ ideas, but 
went on to reject the elites too. This shows that electoral volatility can be determined 
by ‘how people respond to what has been going on in politics’ (Vowles et al 
1995:44). Indeed, new institutions can be set up, more parties and supplied but still 
‘volatility of electoral preferences does not occur unless the voter changes her vote 
between elections from one party to another party…’ (Birnir, 2006:66).    
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It is apparent therefore that questions about electoral volatility are questions about 
election results. They are questions about why we get the results that we get in 
legislative elections at any given place and time. It is therefore useful to locate the 
causes of variations in electoral volatility not just on institutions like political parties 
and electoral systems but, more importantly, on the political behavior that produces 
election outcomes. Thus, electoral volatility is, at least in part, an outcome of voter 
behavior. Therefore, any explanation of electoral volatility that does not incorporate 
elements of voter behavior is at best incomplete and at worst inaccurate. This study 
adopts a voter-centered approach that seeks to bring voters back at the center of the 
analysis of electoral volatility.2
Electoral instability is a phenomenon originating at the level of individual 
behavior, but which acquires political relevance only by reference to the 
changes which it produces in the structure of party systems.




                                                 
2 This study does not engage in a deep discussion of political parties and their mobilizing 
role, since there is an enormous volume of literature on the subject. In fact, as already 
pointed out, most scholars of electoral volatility view it purely as a party systems issue. 
However, it is useful to consider political parties as potential venues, where individual 
economic voting decisions can be aggregated. The study acknowledges that political parties 
in Africa can potentially mobilize voters, using the economy as a campaign platform, to 
vote in a way that significantly affects electoral volatility. In Botswana, for example, the 
ruling BDP’s campaign agenda in the 2004 elections was pegged on Vision 2016, which 
promises a much improved quality of life for the people of Botswana by the year 2016. In 
response, the opposition pledged to address poverty, income inequality, and unemployment, 
while pouring cold water on the vision as unattainable under BDP. The BDP manifesto 
reiterated the miracle of “the diamond boom”, and how the party moved the country “from 
rags to riches”. BDP capitalized on the country’s international image as the ‘African 
miracle’, to assure the electorate that it holds the key to better life. Voters were assured that, 
even if their individual circumstances are not good enough, it would be worse without BDP. 
(EISA http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/comtables.htm).     




While a shift in preference by a few people is normal and expected in an election, it 
becomes a puzzle when a majority of voters at some aggregate level (constituency, 
municipality or province), presumably acting independently, simultaneously decide 
to shift support from one political party to another in two consecutive elections. To 
address the puzzle, the study takes recourse to economic voting theories. One reason 
for doing so is that, although African voter behavior has typically been explained in 
terms of ethnic voting theory, evidence shows that ethnicity is no longer sufficient 
in explaining election outcomes in most African countries (Posner and Simon, 2002; 
Norris and Mattes, 2003; Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008). The bottom line is that, ‘a 
broader overview of African elections- including Kenya’s December 2007 
[parliamentary] contest- reveals that voters consider factors other than ethnicity in 
deciding how to vote’ (Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008:1). Many studies have thus 
concluded that African voters have not been properly researched and are therefore 
misunderstood (Schaffer, 2000; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008).  
This study is therefore cast within the broader context of the search for alternative 
explanations of African voter behavior. This study examines whether changes in the 
aggregate living conditions influences electoral volatility. The focus on living 
conditions is motivated by the fact that several past studies have unearthed solid 
evidence of economic voting in the United States, Western and Eastern Europe, as 
well as Latin America (Tavits, 2005). As far back as the 1980s, Paldam (1981) 
concluded that the relationship between economic conditions and voting is beyond 
doubt and that what was still unclear is the causal mechanism through which 
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economic conditions influence elections (Reed and Brunk, 1984). Yet, as recently as 
2005, it was still being observed that Africa is the most neglected region in the 
world when it comes to economic voting (Youde, 2005). That is, despite the 
prevalent use of economic voting theories in other parts of the world, they have not 
received sufficient attention in Africa.  
To be fair, there have been studies that link African voting behavior to economic 
variables. However, most of these studies tend to be single country case studies such 
the 2001 presidential elections in The Gambia (Saine, 2008), the 2005 elections in 
Ethiopia (Arriola, 2008), Mali’s 2007 elections (Baudais and Sborgi, 2008), as well 
as survey data on Ghana (Lindberg and Morrison, 2008). In fact, a post-election 
survey in Zambia in 1996 found a strong correlation between economic decline and 
loss of support by the incumbent president (Posner and Simon 2002). In his study of 
Ghana, Youde (2005) also found evidence that support for incumbency is driven by 
economic voting. However, Youde’s study used support for the government as an 
indicator of the popularity of the ruling party. The problem with the study is that 
data on support for government was collected eighteen months before the data on 
the economic situation was obtained. It is thus difficult to tell whether the same 
support prevailed at the time of collecting data on economic situation. What is 
disturbing though is that these and other single country studies have been used to 
draw generalizations about Africa. A notable exception is Bratton et al (2005) who 
did a cross-national study of a handful of African countries also found evidence of 
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economic voting. It is for this reason that Chege (2008) calls for cross-national 
studies as a basis for drawing generalizations about Africa.  
Most of the studies on economic voting in Africa do not directly focus on electoral 
volatility and those that focus on volatility tend to ignore the economy. Like Tavits 
(2008) whose focus was on emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, Mozaffar and 
Scarritt (2005) attributes the high levels of volatility in Africa to the existence of 
‘many short-lived parties and their rapid entry and exit in democratic elections’ (p. 
408). As I have already explained, evidence from Africa does not seem to support 
the argument that, party entry and exit determines volatility in the continent.  
Despite weakness in these studies, anecdotal clues suggest that African voting 
patterns respond to economic trends. In a recent BBC interview with potential 
Zambian voters before the 2008 presidential by-elections, the economy emerged 
again as the key concern for voters. One of those interviewed from Mafulira in the 
Copperbelt Province observed that:  
There are a lot of issues that have prompted my voting choice but mainly 
it is the economy of our country. To be very precise, the town where I 
come from here in the Copper belt of Zambia is the largest producer of 
copper but the situation is very bad - in terms of infrastructure, roads, and 
housing. Those are the critical areas that I am getting at.  The present 
government has failed to look into these issues very, very seriously4
 
  
                                                 




The problem, however, is that ‘economic voting is often presented as a black box, 
with economic variables serving as inputs and electoral volatility as outputs. Hardly 
do we see efforts to open the black box’ (Dorussen and Taylor, 2002:5). Scholars 
typically build models and throw in economic variables without highlighting how 
these economic variables are transformed into election results. I argue that voters 
occupy a central position in the black box in that they process the economic variable 
inputs into electoral volatility. Economic variables influence voters’ perception of 
the political elite, which in turn, inform their voting choices that produce electoral 
volatility. More specifically, I argue that voters use economic variables to measure 
the performance of incumbents and decide whether to punish or reward them. Of 
course, voters, particularly in Africa neither have sufficient information nor the 
capacity to correctly interpret economic variables like inflation or GDP growth rate. 
However, as one scholar observes, ‘it is thus not necessary that voters know the 
exact numbers as long as the numbers accurately reflect what the voters are actually 
paying attention to’ (Fair, 2002:58).    
While many voters, particularly the illiterate and rural poor, may not know GDP 
growth rate, inflation, or even unemployment rates, they know about availability 
and quality of medical services, education, infrastructure, water, and housing. In 
short, they know the totality of their living conditions. This calls for a measurement 
of the economy that captures what the voter easily relates to. In this regard, the 
study uses Human Development Index (HDI), which as I will show later, captures 
what is immediately visible to the voter. 
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Generally, this thesis is organized into six parts. Part Two provides an outline of the 
research problem, theory, and methodology. The next three sections present and 
analyze data that test the utility of the investor-voter model. More specifically, Part 
Three is a cross-national study of 30 Sub-Saharan African countries, taking the state 
as the unit of analysis. Part Four and Five focuses on two of the 30 countries 
studied in part three, namely Kenya and South Africa. In both cases, provincial level 
data are used. The Kenyan case is further refined to include the constituency level 
data, while the South African case has also been narrowed down to the municipal-
level. This fusion of cross-national aggregate data with local-level aggregate data is 
not unique to this study.5
 
 Part Six of this thesis is the conclusion of the study which 
gives an overview of key findings, and points out directions for future research.   
 
 
                                                 
5 Fusion of cross-national data with local-level data has been used by Madrid (2005) who 
studied the impact of ethnic cleavage on electoral volatility in Latin America. His study 
began with a national-level analysis of electoral volatility in 18 Latin American countries, 
and then narrowed down to the provincial electoral volatility in Bolivia. In fact, his study 
replicated the study by Roberts and Wibbels (1999) which adopted the same approach. 
22 
 
CHAPTER II: RESEARCH QUESTION, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY  
2.1 Study Puzzle and Research Question  
Once the voters are brought to the center of the analysis of the causes of electoral 
volatility, two interrelated questions immediately arise. First, why do voters shift 
support from one party to another in consecutive elections? Second, should an 
analysis of the causes of electoral volatility focus on the individual voter behavior or 
on voter behavior at some higher level of aggregation? 
 
These questions point to the research puzzle for this study, which can be understood 
at the individual, constituency, provincial and national levels. At the individual 
level, it is puzzling why a voter would support a political party or candidate in one 
election and reject the same party/candidate (sometimes violently) in the subsequent 
election. At the constituency level, it is puzzling why some constituencies tend to 
reject incumbent legislators/parties, while others stick to the same party/legislator 
for a long time. For example, Kenya has held four elections (1992, 1997, 2002 and 
2007) since the rebirth of multiparty democracy in 1991. However, although central 
province of Kenya is fairly homogenous with the Kikuyu ethnic group constituting 
nearly 94% of its population (Alwy and Schech, 2004), several constituencies in the 
province (and indeed in other provinces) have changed parties at each of the four 





. At the national level, there is a puzzle as to why a political party with a 
huge majority in the legislature would lose almost all the seats in the next election. 
Yet this is exactly what happened in the 1993 Canadian elections explained earlier. 
These cases are neither isolated nor confined to Kenya, but are part of an apparently 
complex pattern of voter behavior. Indeed, Long and Reich (2002) observes that 
since 1980, Turkish voters have always rejected more than half of the incumbent 
deputies standing for elections. Turkish voter rejection of sitting deputies reached 
unprecedented proportions in 1991, when some regions of Turkey rejected all their 
incumbent deputies and hence reported ‘a complete turnover of parliamentary 
representation’ (Long and Reich 2002:26). 
 
Focusing on the voters also raises a methodological dilemma. On the one hand, 
volatility is about election outcomes and on the other hand, there is what Hirschbein 
(1999) calls the ‘powerlessness of the individual voter’ expressed by the fact that 
‘the probability of an individual vote influencing the outcome of national election 
approaches zero’ (Hirschbein, 1999:7). At the core of the puzzle is the question of 
how to treat the voter in the analysis of electoral volatility. Should one focus on the 
individual voter or on some aggregate voter behavior? A decision must be made one 
way, and either way there is a risk. Focusing on aggregate voter behavior poses the 
risk of engaging in ecological fallacy. However, focusing on the individual voter 
                                                 




also has the potential of leading us to the individualistic fallacy which is less talked 
about but equally problematic. The former involves drawing inferences about 
individuals from aggregate-level data, while the latter involves drawing inferences 
in the reverse direction (Landman, 2008). 
 
If we take electoral volatility simply as an aspect of election results, treat election 
results as the distribution of aggregate voter preferences, and limit our analysis and 
interpretations to a suitable aggregate level, we overcome threats to the ecological 
fallacy. Since a shift in an individual voter's party preference is unlikely to alter 
electoral volatility scores in large elections, there is need to focus on voter behavior 
at some aggregate level to explain electoral volatility. As Sarah Birch (1998) notes, 
individual-level data tend to ignore the influence of contextual factors on voter 
behavior and hence isolate individual behavior from the environment in which it 
occurs (Kuzio, 1998). Yet, ‘evidence  strongly suggests that local contexts (at a 
variety of scales) influence voter attitudes and behavior, and that many individual 
characteristics associated with such behavior are themselves locally stimulated, if 
not created’ (Zuckerman,2005:184).   
 
The critical question underlying these puzzles is: what drives a group of voters at 
some level of aggregation (national, provincial, constituency or municipal) to shift 
party preferences? I argue in this paper that, since the decision to vote is arrived at 
independently by each voter, for a sufficiently large number of voters to converge 
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on the decision to shift partisanship, they must be driven by an issue that is salient 
within the aggregate unit in question. Since the focus of the study is on Africa, it is 
useful to begin by noting that, ‘African countries dominate the rank of the poorest 
economies in the globe’ (Edoho, 1997:13). At the same time, it has been noted that, 
people’s orientations to politics are also shaped by where they live (Worshinsky, 
2008:123). Given these two observations, it is reasonable to expect that the living 
conditions in Africa affect electoral volatility in the continent.  
 
The key research question therefore is: Do living conditions influence electoral 
volatility in Sub-Saharan Africa?   
 
2.2 Study Objectives and Rationale  
The primary objective of this study is to determine whether voters’ living conditions 
influence electoral volatility in sub-Saharan Africa. Although economic voting 
theories are widely used in other parts of the world (Epperly, 2008), they have not 
received sufficient attention in Africa. Sometimes, inappropriate economic variables 
have been incorporated in volatility models and, as would be expected, they turn out 
to be statistically insignificant. Ishiyama (2006), for example, found that Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) per Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has no statistically 
significant influence on electoral volatility. He also found that economic freedom 
does not influence electoral volatility. However, I argue that, due to the high cost of 
information, it is unlikely that voters can distinguish those aspects of their economic 
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hardship that are attributable to local investments, from those that are due to FDI. 
Their expectation is that the government/ruling party should be able to cushion them 
from economic hardships of any kind and from whatever source. In fact, according 
to the investor-voter model, ‘voters have issue interests but expect those interests to 
be generalized because of the cost of information’ (Popkin et al, 1976, cited in 
Ferguson and Rogers, 1984:153). The theoretical linkage, which Ishiyama (2006) 
establishes between FDI and electoral volatility, is therefore unclear.  
While many studies use voters opinion on the state of the economy, this study looks 
at the actual living conditions at the time of the elections. As Kramer (1983) argues, 
the national economy of any country at any given time is a constant. I underscore 
this point by noting that Nigeria’s HDI for the year 2009, for example, is the same 
regardless of whether one is in Lagos, Enugu, Abuja or Onitsha. It does not vary for 
Yoruba or Igbo, Christian or Muslim, educated or illiterate, poor or rich. If interview 
respondents have perfect information about the state of their national economy, their 
description should be the same, since they would essentially be describing the same 
thing. Therefore, when the state of the same economy is described differently, then 
either the respondents lack adequate information about it and hence perceive it 
differently, or they simply do not to tell the truth. Either way, such data do not 
reflect the state of the national economy. At best they show people’s perceptions 
about the national economy and not the economy itself.   
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Unlike many studies that use the individual voter as the unit of analysis, this study 
uses aggregate voter behavior as its unit of analysis. It follows from Kramer (1983) 
who suggests the need to study voters at some higher level of aggregation rather 
than at the individual. According to Kramer (1983), aggregate-level data offers the 
best estimate of how economic conditions influence voter behavior. This is because 
unlike the individual-level data which relies on subjective measures of economic 
conditions, aggregate level studies are based on objective assessments of economic 
conditions (Brug et al, 2007:194).  
 
Similarly most studies on electoral volatility in Africa tend to be largely descriptive, 
univariate comparative analysis of party systems. Mozaffar and Scarritt (2005) for 
example, use aggregate Africa-wide mean, median, and the standard deviations of 
electoral volatility to determine the structure and volatility of African party systems. 
Their study does not examine the causes of electoral volatility. Like other studies, 
they approach volatility from an institutional perspective, as a party systems issue. 
Although they focus on 101 elections held in 36 African countries, nearly 25% of 
those elections were held in only three countries- Botswana, Mauritius and Gabon.  
 
Driven by some of the concerns raised above, Matthijs Bogaards (2008) submitted a 
prompt rejoinder to Mozaffar and Scarritt (2005). However, like nearly all studies 
on volatility in Africa, Bogaards (2008) also embraces the pure Pedersen index of 
volatility. However, as I will explain later, the Pedersen index measures volatility so 
28 
 
broadly that it includes some elements whose changes are not attributable to voter 
behavior. This study therefore seeks to refine the concept of electoral volatility so 
that it reasonably captures shift in voter preference.  
2.3 Study Limitations 
The main problem that this study faced was data availability. The problem of data 
on African elections is not unique to this study. Bogaards (2008) observes that data 
on African elections are not readily available for many countries. In some cases, 
data was available but was either incomplete or inaccurate. In order to ensure data 
reliability, this study obtained data from multiple sources. For instance, the cross-
national data on election results and voter turnout in Africa were obtained from 
Adam Carr’s Election Archives, the African Elections database, Parline Database on 
National Parliaments, and where possible, the election commissions of the particular 
countries. In most cases, particularly when calculating electoral volatility, data was 
supplemented with information from relevant documents and texts.  
 
In some cases, data was available in a form that required reorganization before it 
could be used. An example is the constituency level data for Kenya. Since I was not 
able to get constituency-level data on Human Development Index (HDI), I used the 
rural poverty incidence, or the Headcount Index, as an indicator of living conditions 
at the constituency-level. However, the rural poverty incidence data for Nairobi and 
North-Eastern provinces were missing. Fortunately, the urban poverty incidence 
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data for Nairobi was available. Since Nairobi has eight constituencies, I selected two 
of the constituencies and used their urban poverty indices.  
 
Furthermore, there was no aggregate constituency-level data on poverty incidence. 
The rural poverty incidence data was collected and aggregated at the level of the 
administrative units known as Districts, Divisions, Locations, and Sub-Locations. 
Traditionally, the boundaries of Divisions coincided with those of a constituency. 
However, in the recent past, Divisions have been created arbitrarily, so that some 
constituencies have as many as four Divisions while others have one. It is therefore, 
difficult to match constituencies with their respective Divisions. The sample is thus 
limited to constituencies that I was able to identify using personal knowledge of the 
country. To avoid biased results and to accommodate possible variations in regional 
voting patterns, the sample shown in Appendix 5 is drawn from several districts.  
 
Due to the problem of data availability, I ended up with small samples which also 
had implications for the choice of analytical methods. For example, in the provincial 
data for Kenya, the number of cases is eight, and for South Africa the number of 
cases is nine. With such small samples it is not feasible to use ordinary least squares 
or robust regression. Instead, I mainly used association tests (Kendall coefficient of 
concordance and Pearson product moment correlation), as well as the test of the 
difference of means, and the test of proportions. Although I have used the test of 
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association (for reasons given in the methodology section), more than the test of the 
difference of means, and the test of proportions, the latter two are equally powerful. 
 
This account of data problems will be incomplete without stating why the study did 
not use the Afrobarometer dataset, which is the most comprehensive data set on 
Africa. First, I have already pointed out why it is inappropriate to use surveys to ask 
individual respondents to gauge the national level economic conditions, and indeed, 
economic conditions at the provincial, district or even constituency levels. On this 
account, the Afrobarometer data cannot measure aggregate living conditions, which 
is the study’s key independent variable. Second, the dataset lack a variable that can 
measure whether respondents have shifted or intend to shift party preference. In the 
absence of such a variable, it is not possible to determine electoral volatility which 
is the key dependent variable. Finally, the dataset only covers few African countries 
regarded as democratic, although there is no guarantee that these countries are a 
representative sample of Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
The study limitations notwithstanding, the datasets I have assembled for the study 
are both adequate for the present task, and could also serve as a foundation on which 
a comprehensive dataset on African elections can be built. Ideally, such a dataset 
would contain continuously updated aggregate-level election data on Sub-Saharan 
African countries. This is important because, most datasets on African elections, 
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such as Nohlen (1999) and Lindberg (2006), only give national-level data but lack 
precinct or intermediate (provincial or constituency) level data.  
2.4 Theoretical Framework 
i. Social Cleavages and Ethnic Voting Theory  
There are a number of scholars who attribute electoral volatility to social cleavage 
voting, which is based on the idea that voters’ political interests are defined by their 
social identities. Consequently, party choices made by voters reflect their position 
along the continuum of the dominant social cleavage (Mainwaring, 1999). As long 
as social cleavages are static, voting behavior is expected to be consistent, stable 
and predictable. Looked at this way, it is understandable why Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967) developed the ‘frozen party system hypothesis’. The logic behind ‘the frozen 
party hypotheses’ is straightforward: parties are formed on the basis of, and draw 
support from, some groups arrayed along different dimensions of the prevailing 
social cleavages. If these cleavages are static, then there is little voter mobility 
across parties. Specifically, advocates of social cleavage theory predict that, as the 
degree of social differentiation increase, volatility will also rise (Bratton et al 2005).  
Salient social cleavages or the basis of social differentiation varies. In the case of 
Africa, ethnicity is the most salient social cleavage. In fact, it is noteworthy that, 
‘fourteen out of fifteen most ethnically heterogeneous societies in the world are in 
Africa’ (Easterly and Lavine 1997: 1219). It is hardly surprising that for a long time 
scholars have tended to explain African voter behavior in terms of the ethnic census 
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theory. These studies typically converge on the idea that African elections are mere 
ethnic census punctuated by voter turnout of the various ethnic groups (Horowitz, 
1985). According to Sisk and Reynolds (1998), the census voting theory is based on 
the twin concepts of ‘ethnic parties’ and ‘ethnic voters’. Horowitz (1985) defines an 
ethnic party as one which embodies the aspirations of one ethnic group and 
champions its course. Such a party draws the bulk of its support from one or a few 
closely related ethnic groups. In this regard, Dowd and Driessen (2008) argue that 
the political parties formed in Sub-Saharan Africa since the rebirth of multiparty 
politics in the 1990s have been ethnic.  
However, as one scholar notes, ‘[the] social cleavage approach currently is out of 
favor because many cases have arisen to dispute its simplistic claims’ (Van Cott, 
2005:7). Evidence seems to suggest that the African voters are less “ethnic” than 
previously thought. Recent studies in African countries like Botswana, Mauritius, 
Malawi, Mali, Lesotho, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya and Ghana show that ethnicity 
plays a modest role in vote choice (Cowen and Laakso, 2002; Posner and Simon, 
2002; Arriola, 2003; Norris and Mattes, 2003; Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008) . In fact, 
key parties/candidates in African elections tend to get broad-based support beyond 




ii. Economic Voting Theories 
Economic voting is typically understood as ‘any change in a voter’s support for 
parties that are caused by a change in economic perceptions’ (Duch & Stevenson, 
2008:41). This definition can be modified in at least three ways to capture economic 
voting in its totality. First, economic voting does not necessarily have to involve a 
shift in party support. Continued support for a party can also constitute economic 
voting if the decision is based on economic considerations. There is no reason to 
suspect that an economic voter would desert a candidate or party that, in his or her 
evaluation, has performed well on the economic front. It has been noted for example 
that Gambian voters are ‘not as gullible or uninformed’ as is often thought, and that 
their penchant to re-elect incumbents is driven more by ‘their savvy for economic 
gain’ than anything else (N’Diaye et al, 2005:98).  Indeed, in a BBC interview with 
potential Gambian voters before the 2004 elections, one of the voters interviewed 
justified her support for the incumbent president Yahya Jammeh by noting that:  
I support Yahya Jammeh because before he came, The Gambia didn’t 
have TV, good hospitals, schools, jobs or electricity- so we have to 
support him by all means because we want our country to develop7
 
 
Second, economic voting does not necessarily have to be a vote about a political 
party. It can as well be a vote about an incumbent legislator or even a civic leader. 
In many countries, legislators have huge developmental roles. Kenya for example, 
                                                 




pioneered the Constituency Development Funds (CDF) in 2003 as devolved funds 
meant to ‘take development projects to the citizens at the grassroots level’ (Shah, 
2007:491). The CDF concept has since been adopted by countries such as Malawi, 
Uganda, and Zambia. Tanzania introduced a bill in parliament to adopt CDF in 
2009.8
Third, economic voting is not just about voters’ perception of the economy. It can 
refer to the real economic situation as captured in official government records. It is 
in this regard, that scholars like Tavits (2008) use GDP growth rate and inflation to 
measure economic voting. I therefore define economic voting as any vote for a party 
or candidate based primarily on economic considerations.  
 In all these countries, CDF are controlled by legislators. If voters feel their 
living conditions have not significantly changed since the last elections, they have 
many options of venting out their anger. They can blame the central government and 
punish the ruling party in the next elections for not providing sufficient devolved 
funds. Alternatively, they can blame and punish the incumbent legislator for not 
using the funds prudently to improve their lives. Either way, that sort of vote is an 
economic vote since it is driven by reflections on economic living conditions.  
Although there are many ways of classifying economic theories, the most striking 
classification is the dichotomy between sociotropic and egotropic voting. The 
distinction emerged out of the debate about whether, in making voting decisions, 
voters are driven by their personal economic situation or by their assessment of 
                                                 
8 Tanzania government introduced a bill to create CDFs on July 23, 2009: The Citizen 
Newspaper. Dar es Salam –http://allafrica.com/stories/200907240330.html (08/15/09). 
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macro-economic trends. The former view coalesced into egotropic voting theory, 
while the latter evolved into sociotropic voting theory. The debate traces back to the 
study by Kramer (1971) who found that individual self-interest defined in terms of 
personal economic circumstances is the prime driving force in the voter decision-
making calculus.  However, another study by Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) found that 
voters are motivated more by considerations about the national economic conditions 
rather than by their individual economic circumstances. 
Most studies on sociotropic voting tend to focus on how macro-economic conditions 
at the national level influence voting decisions. Among the macroeconomic factors 
that dominate the literature on sociotropic voting are national GDP, inflation and 
unemployment rates. I take a broader view of sociotropic voting not just as voting 
motivated by national economic conditions, but as any voting decision informed by 
aggregate living conditions, whether at the national level or at any aggregate level 
such as regions, provinces or districts. It is about voting decisions driven by 
concerns for collective economic wellbeing rather than private/ individual good. For 
example, concerns about the need to upgrade key roads in a constituency, erect 
dykes to prevent periodic flooding of a river bank in a district, conserve water 
catchment areas, or improve schools and health facilities in a province, are not 
private/individual goods but collective/public goods. Indeed, a poor road network, 
inadequate water, poor states of health facilities and low education standards in a 
given constituency directly feed into aggregate living conditions. In other words, 
‘sociotropic voting ‘evaluates candidates on the basis of collective rather than 
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individual concerns’ so that ‘public rather than private interests determine one’s 
political actions’ (Carpini and Keeter, 1997). 
On the other hand, egotropism which is also known as pocketbook voting theory 
emphasizes the individual economic circumstances as the key determinant of their 
voting decisions. In other words, when voters face economic hardships they tend to 
apportion blames on the ruling party even for their personal woes and therefore vote 
against it in protest (Reed and Brunk, 1984). 
iii. The Investor-Voter Model  
This study uses the investor-voter model, which is a variant of the rational choice 
theory. The model was developed by Samuel Popkin, John Gorman, Charles Philips 
and Jeffrey Smith (1976), in reaction to the work of the Michigan school. The 
central thesis of the Michigan school was that, electoral choices are shaped by party 
identification, which they regarded as, ‘the prism through which voters formed 
opinion’ (Rosenof, 2003:76). However, after the 1968 and 1972 US elections, it was 
apparent, even to the Michigan scholars, that voters did not vote purely along party 
lines. Issues seemed to have played a major role in shaping voter decisions in the 
two elections. As a result, in 1976, four Michigan scholars- Arthur Miller, Warren 
Miller, Alden Raine and Thad Brown- wrote, A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy 
Voting in the 1972 Elections, in which they sought to revise the American voter 
model. They noted that voters have changed, and admitted that voting decisions in 
the 1972 elections were based on issues, and not party identity (Rosenof, 2003). 
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Popkin and colleagues rejected the argument that voters have changed, and instead 
noted that, the Michigan school had been wrong all along in their conceptualization 
of the voter. They therefore, developed the investor-voter model, which has been 
described as, ‘a pioneering attempt to incorporate the cost of obtaining and 
processing information into the analysis of voter behavior’ (Ferguson, 1995:25). 
 In this section, therefore, I expound the investor-voter model by highlighting four 
propositions drawn from the model, which serves both as a description of an 
investor-voter and as the assumptions that guided this study. In this regard, I define 
investor-voters as those whose voting behavior conforms to the four propositions of 
the investor-voter model listed below:  
Proposition 1: Investor-Voters are rational and capable of appraising the state of 
the economy from their personal experience even with inadequate information
The investor-voter model borrowed some of its premises from earlier rational choice 
theories, notably the work of Anthony Downs (1957). One of its points of departure 
from Downs is the cost of information and how it shapes voter behavior. Downs 
argued that the high cost of information renders voters uninformed. Since the odds 
of one vote influencing election results are low, the cost of voting is greater than its 
benefits, and hence voting is not a rational act (Fishkin and Laslett 2003).  
. 
However, while acknowledging high information costs, Popkin et al (1976) argue 
that voters are still able to get information sufficient to form a broad general idea of 
political party and candidates’ positions on issues that concern them. They get this 
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information in the course of going about their daily activities. For example, potential 
voters learn about inflation when they notice rapid changes in retail prices. Using 
this information they form an opinion about the state of the economy and develop 
propositions on the basis of which they vote (Popkin et al, 1976).  
Voters are, therefore, rational in the sense that, ‘they do not ignore the information 
they have, do not fabricate information they do not have, and do not chose what 
they do not want’ (Achen, 1992:198, cited in Sisk and Reynolds, 1998: 126). The 
idea that voters, despite scarce information, are capable of evaluating candidates and 
parties is shared by many scholars (Pomper, 1988; Popkin, 1994; Brug et al 2007). 
Pomper, 1988, for example, notes that: 
I do not see most voters as capable of understanding theories of 
Keynesian or supply-side economics, or the deadly logic of nuclear 




It seems that the greatest dilemma for the voter is how to invest their votes in such a 
way that they can reap maximum returns from them. Sometimes voters get it right 
and elect leaders committed to their course, but in some cases they get it wrong. 
That is, because of inadequate information, ‘it is possible for both parties and voters 
to make mistakes. They may elect a party that imposes unexpected costs, or parties 
may adopt strategies that do not attract voters’ (Koetble 1991:231). Elections 
                                                 
9 Pomper, Gerald M. 1992. Voters, Elections and Parties: The Practice of Democratic 
Theory. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Page 26. 
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therefore give voters a chance to rectify mistakes made in past elections by shifting 
support to more promising parties or candidates.  
If voters are capable of assessing the state of the economy, one can expect that the 
voters’ perceptions of the national or regional economic trends would closely reflect 
objective economic trends. In essence, just as one can ask voters their view of the 
past or present national or regional economic situation in a survey, one can also get 
the information about the actual economic situation from records of the economic 
trends. At the same time, just as one can ask voters how they voted, one can also 
check the outcome of elections. If this is so, then aggregate data about voting results 
and the real economic conditions are sufficient to enable us get a fair assessment of 
the influence of economic conditions on election outcomes.  
The investor-voter model is anchored on the premise that a voter is an investor and 
each vote is ‘an investment in one or more collective goods under conditions of 
uncertainty with costly and imperfect information’ (Popkin et al 1976:780). Popkin 
et al notes that an election is a collective good in the sense that both its outcome and 
the government that it puts into office are for the entire electorate. In fact, they view 
a political party as ‘a coalition of voters coordinating their efforts to pursue a set of 
collective goods’ (Ferguson, 1984: 155). For example, if a voter decides not to vote 
for an incumbent legislator because he or she failed to secure employment for the 
Proposition 2: Investor-voters are aware that voting is an individual act but its 
outcome yields both personal and collective benefits. 
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voter, it is doubtful that other voters will fail to vote for the incumbent for the same 
reason unless they have similar or related grievance against the incumbent legislator. 
That is, a voter’s personal experience is only relevant if it is shared or endorsed by 
several other voters so that it becomes a mobilizing issue. But once an individual’s 
personal experience becomes a mobilizing issue, it ceases to be a personal but a 
group shared experience. This explains why ‘a person may vote against a 
presidential candidate because she thinks the country has been harmed by his 
policies, even though she herself is personally better off’ (Mueller, 2003:460-461). 
The investor-voter model posits that partisanship is less stable and the strength and 
durability of attachment to political parties is a function of the extent to which 
voters perceive the party position to be in line with their core issues. The non-
enduring nature of partisanship is a testimony that voters can easily shift political 
allegiances. It is shifts in allegiance that alter the fortunes of political parties during 
elections, as some gain and others lose seats. Voters’ evaluations of whether their 
investment in voting has yielded satisfactory dividends determine whether they stick 
with the same choices they made in the last elections or shift loyalty.  
Proposition 3: Investor-voters are less attached to political parties and candidates, 
and can easily shift allegiance if dissatisfied with the incumbents. 
Scholars on African politics are increasingly coming to terms with the reality that 
voters are not as committed to political parties as is often thought. When deciding 
the party to support, voters consider, among other factors, the economy, government 
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performance, and how the country is doing generally (Reynolds 1999). The weak 
attachment to parties is captured by a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
interview with Gambian voters before the 2004 elections. One respondent noted: 
I am supporting Ousainou Darboe’s United Democratic Party because it’s 
time for change. We’ve seen what President Jammeh has done, now let’s 




The model predicts a strong relationship between voters’ living conditions and their 
political behavior. More specifically, as voters’ living conditions changes, their 
political participation also changes in response to emerging opportunities and 
realities. Investor-voters care about outputs and hence look out for indicators of 
competence among parties/candidates. They use past performance of incumbent 
parties as a gauge for measuring their competence. That is, ‘as an investor, the voter 
is concerned not with abstract policies of the candidates, but rather with what the 
candidate [or party] can be expected to deliver’ (Ferguson and Rogers 1984:161). 
Proposition 4: The voting behavior of investor-voters is influenced by their living 
conditions.  
                                                 




2.5 Research Methodology   
i. Research Hypotheses   
This study tests the hypothesis that the higher the living conditions, the lower the 
electoral volatility.  The hypothesis follows directly from the fourth proposition of 
the investor-voter model stated above. Before testing this hypothesis or even 
specifying the variables, it is vital to reflect on whether the direction of causality has 
been modeled properly and the implications for a shift in the direction of causality. 
That is, why do I expect living conditions to influence electoral volatility and not 
vice versa? Is it not possible that low volatility creates party stability, which leads to 
a better policy making environment and hence higher HDI? 
Generally, the causal direction of a model is defined by theory which provides the 
perspective from which to view the relationship between variables. The investor-
voter model is part of the economic voting theories, which specify that the economy 
is what drives politics. In fact, in very broad terms, this study attempts to establish 
the causal link between levels of development and democratic values. From Lipset’s 
(1959) seminal work, we derive the idea that socioeconomic advancement enhances 
democracy. Several scholars have since come to the same conclusion. For example, 
in a pooled time-series analysis of 131 countries, Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) 
found that economic advancement aid democracy, but democracy does not facilitate 
economic development (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck cited in Lane and Ersson 1999). 
This calls for modeling causal effects from the economy to politics. 
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ii. Key Dependent Variable: Electoral Volatility  
Electoral volatility is a measure of the change in the distribution of seats among 
parties in the national legislatures, which result from shifts in voter preferences in 
successive elections (Cortana 1999; Clarke and Foweraker 2001). The most widely 
used measure of electoral volatility is the Pederson Index which is half of the sum of 
the net changes in the electoral strengths of all competing political parties. Party 
electoral strength is measured in terms of the votes or seats received in an election. 
The Index is computed using the formula:  
Electoral Volatility = ∑  1
  2
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1   |𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 + 1)|  
where n is the total number of political parties which competed in the elections; and 
𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)|△ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  𝑡𝑡 | is the change in number of votes received by each party in two 
successive elections (Pedersen 1979; Clarke & Foweraker 2001). The value of 
Volatility (EV) lies within the parameters: 0 ≤ EV≤ 100. Volatility score of zero 
means that there is no change in party strengths and no seats lost or gained by any 
party. A score of 100 implies that there is complete shift in party loyalty, and a 
complete change in the legislatures’ composition.   
At the national level, I used seats rather than votes and therefore substituted 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖  for 
votes with 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  for seats in the above formula. When computing electoral volatility 
using seats, only political parties which get at least one seat in either of the two 
successive elections become relevant. In this regard, n is now the total number of 
political parties that secured at least one seat in at least one of the two successive 
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elections. The decision to use seats rather than votes is partly motivated by problems 
of data availability given that ‘the figures for share of votes are missing for more 
African elections than those for share of seats and even when available are likely to 
be less reliable…’(Lindberg 2006:41). Similarly, several past studies on volatility in 
Africa such as Basedau et al (2007) have also used seats rather than votes.  
Furthermore, seats are important at the national level because party seat-share 
shapes the structure of legislative decision making and public policy formulation. 
When a party enjoys a significant majority in the legislature, it can set and pursue its 
policies and legislative agenda without entering into a coalition (Lindberg 2006). 
Serious political parties are formed first and foremost to compete for and win power 
so that they can implement their policies. To be able to make or significantly 
influence public policy a party must gain foothold in the legislature. It is therefore 
the number of seats rather than the number of votes that determines the 
parliamentary strength of a party. In the words of Ersson and Lane (1998), ‘what 
counts first and foremost for the parties as political players are the consequences of 
election outcomes for their mandates in parliament’ (Pennings and Lane, 1998:32). 
Botswana, for example, is regarded as a stable democracy with a dominant party, 
the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). The party has won all the ten elections held 
and has ruled the country since independence in 1965. However, the fact that BDP 
wins the majority of seats masks the reality of the stiff challenge it often faces in 
parliamentary elections. In the 2004 elections for example, BDP won 80% of the 
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seats although it had only 52% of popular votes. Furthermore, in almost 20 of the 57 
constituencies, the party barely scratched through with razor-thin winning margins 
of as few as 2% of votes cast. In several constituencies, such as Kglagadi North, 
Selibe Phikwe East, Letlhateng East, Gaborone North and Kgatleng West, the 
contests were too close to call and the winning margins were even less than the 
spoilt votes. For unclear reasons, even where the winning margin is just a handful of 
votes, it is usually the BDP candidate who wins11
To underscore this fact, one needs to look at close contests in countries with large 
number of voters per constituency such as Ghana. In the 2004 Ghanaian elections, 
the National Patriotic Party (NPP) candidate won Ablekuma Central constituency in 
the Greater Accra region by 47,731 votes against 44,027 votes for the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) candidate.
. The slim margins of victory 
notwithstanding, the BDP got a clear majority in the national assembly to carry out 
its policy and legislative agenda. 
12
                                                 
11 Elections Institute of Southern Africa, 2005: http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/botswana.htm.  
 While the NDC candidate proved he was 
no pushover in the constituency, the question is: Of what use are the 44,027 votes to 
the NDC now that they did not win the seat? True, it shows that the party has some 
following, but what value did that add to their quest to govern Ghana in 2004? The 
key point here is that in the First-Past-the-Post electoral system neither the margin 
of victory nor the votes received by the losing candidate matters when it comes to 
12 Electoral Commission of Ghana: http://www.ec.gov.gh/ 
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seat distribution. In fact even in proportional representation, votes received matter 
not as ends but as a means of getting seats.   
However, I should point out that in Kenya’s constituency level analysis, as well as 
the South African provincial and municipal level analysis, I used votes rather than 
seats to measure electoral volatility.13
 
 In Kenya, this was necessary because at the 
constituency level, there is only one seat, and hence it makes no sense to measure 
volatility of seats. In the case of South Africa, there are no constituencies in the first 
place and hence only data on votes are available. Under South Africa’s proportional 
representation, the percentage of seats and votes received tend to be close. In any 
case, it is apparent that proportional representation ‘produces a nearly-identical 
correlation between the percentage of votes that a party receives in an election and 
the percentage of seats that it wins in the legislature’ (Worshinsky, 2008:187). 
In computing Pedersen index, I made and consistently applied some decision rules 
to get a uniform scale. First, where there is bicameral legislature, the study focused 
on the lower house in line with the trend in the literature (Mainwaring 1999; 
Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005). Second, where two or more parties merge or form 
coalition in between elections, the sum of the seats won by the parties in the past 
election is compared with seats won by the merged party/coalition as done by 
                                                 
13 Using seats to measure volatility at the cross-national level and, votes at the in-country 
level, does not pose any analytical challenges. This would only be a concern, if the goal of 
the study is to test whether the economy predicts volatility better at one level than the other. 
However, this study does not intend to go that far; it is content with testing whether the 
economy is a predictor of volatility at different levels of aggregation independently. 
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Bartolini and Mair (1990), as well as Wheatley (2005). Third, where a party splits or 
a coalition breaks, I follow the example of Bartolini and Mair (1990), and compare 
the seats received by the original party/coalition before the split with the total 
number of seats received by all the factions after the split. Four, I treated 
independent candidates as though they constitute one distinct party since they also 
gain and lose seats to political parties in successive elections.  
Finally, unlike Bartolini and Mair (1990), who treat a party that has changed names 
between elections as a new party, I treat such a party as the same party. This is in 
line with Birch (2001), Krzysztof Jasiewicz (in Webb and White, 2007) as well as 
Bogaards (2008). In any case, parties mean more than just names. In addition to 
names, they have structures, constitutions, ideology, leadership, membership, flags, 
symbols, assets and liabilities. Like business firms, political parties rebrand in order 
to remain relevant and appeal to a broad support base. It is the need to rebrand that 
led National Party (NP) in South Africa, for example, to change its name to New 
National Party (NNP). However, ‘even the slight name change, adding “New” to 
National Party, made no difference’ in the eyes of the voters (Reynolds, 1999:90).  
I recognize that not all volatility results from shift in voter preferences. Indeed, 
Birch (2001) identifies three components of volatility. There is volatility due to shift 
in the composition of the electorate, change in the range of parties available, and 
change in voter preference. Change in the electorate composition would only affect 
volatility if new voters tend to vote differently from the others. However, while 
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there are studies that suggest that change in the composition of the electorate 
influences election results (Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007), other studies have found 
that change in the composition of the electorate does not matter (Teixeira, 1992; 
Rosema, 2007). Teixeira (1992) for example argues that there is no significant 
difference between those who vote and those who abstain, and hence change in the 
composition of the electorate does not matter. In fact, a study of elections in Chile in 
the pre- and post-authoritarian periods found that the change in the composition of 
the electorate did not significantly alter the support enjoyed by political parties in 
the post-authoritarian period (Valenzuela and Scully, 1997). 
Lesotho is a good example of how change in the composition of the electorate failed 
to alter electoral fortunes of political parties. Lesotho became independent in 1965 
as a constitutional monarchy. The post-independence elections were heavily tilted in 
favor of Basotho National Party (BNP), which narrowly defeated Basotho Congress 
Party (BCP). However, BCP defeated BNP in the next elections in 1970. Instead of 
handing power to BCP, Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan who was the BNP leader, 
suspended the constitution and created an authoritarian regime, which lasted until he 
was overthrow in 1986. The military regime organized democratic elections in 
1993. Interestingly, the party system did not change despite the twenty-three year 
authoritarian and military interlude. In the 1993 elections, BCP won all the 65 
contested seats. This time, the military handed over power to BCP but a year later, 
BNP conspired with the monarch and the military to overthrow BCP forcing SADC 
to intervene and restore the BCP government. In 1997, BCP split, with the smaller 
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faction retaining the name and the major faction headed by the prime minister, 
becoming Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). In 1998, LCD won 77 of the 80 
seats. As before, BNP rejected results and organized protests, which culminated into 
widespread violence and an attempted overthrow of the LCD. It took the 
intervention of Botswana and South Africa to restore order after which a new 
constitution was negotiated, which made Lesotho the first African country to adopt 
the mixed member proportional electoral system. In the 2002 elections, LCD won 
79 of the 80 seats elected through First-Past-The-Post System. It was however not 
entitled to a share of the 40 seats distributed on the basis of proportional 
representation. 21 of these seats went to BNP, while the LPC, which split from 
LCD, got 5 seats (Freedom House, 2006:413-414). In essence, since 1970, voters 
have always identified with one party despite generational change. 
According to Birch (2001) volatility within the existing party system needs to be 
separated from volatility due to the emergence of new parties, or party replacement. 
I find this separation unnecessary in the context of this study. If voter v1 supports, 
party p1 in elections at time t, but supports pn at elections at t+1 despite the fact that 
p1 is also competing in the elections at t+1, then v1 has shifted preference. I refer to 
such a voter as a defector-voter because he or she has abandoned the party he or she 
supported and now supports a different one. From our earlier discussions, it 
becomes clear that investor voters are in fact defector voters due to their propensity 
to shift preference for rational considerations. It is true that the emergence of new 
parties widens the scope of choice for voters and that a new party may sometimes be 
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ideologically closer to the voter. However, it is also true that elections do not give 
voters a chance to express their optimum preferences. As already stated, voter 
preferences at t and t+1 shows their best options in the circumstances and not 
necessarily their optimum choices. Therefore, when voters consciously abandon 
earlier party preferences for a new party, the reason for doing so notwithstanding, 
they have shifted party preferences. Since the reasons for shifting party preferences 
are what the study is interested in, if we isolate party replacement from electoral 
volatility, we omit those elements of shift in voter preferences which are embedded 
in the replacement scores.  
However, if p1 does not participate in elections held at t+1, then v1 is not considered 
to have shifted preference even if he/she votes for a new party. I refer to such a 
voter as a deserted-voter because it is the party that has deserted him or her and not 
the other way round. Since we cannot tell whether those who supported p1 at t would 
have supported the same party at t+1 if it had participated, it is unfair to the voters 
to conclude as Birch does, that the voters have shifted preference. I therefore, refer 
to the seats held by p1 after elections at t as deserted seats since p1 is not fighting to 
retain them at t+1.  
In computing volatility therefore, I subtracted the share of the deserted seats from 
the Pedersen’s index. Since there is no way of knowing the parties that gained the 
deserted seats from aggregate data, I obtain volatility due to preference shift by 
subtracting the total share of the deserted seats from the Pedersen index. To 
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understand the reason for, and the process of subtracting the deserted seats, I take a 
close look at the Pedersen index. The reason why Pedersen index involves dividing 
seat changes by two is because electoral volatility results from a zero sum game in 
which votes or seats lost or ‘deserted’ by one party (or independent candidate) are 
simultaneously gained by another party or candidate. In other words, seats changed 
have a dual identity-each seat changed is both a lost seat and a gained seat at the 
same time. When you add all the seats that have changed hands among parties after 
two successive elections, you actually add both losses and gains and in the process 
double the net seat change. You must then divide by two to get real net seat change.  
In order to get volatility due to shift in voter preference, I first expressed all the 
seats gained by parties as a percentage of the seats contested in the year when the 
respective elections were held. This ensures that even where there were changes in 
the number of seats, all the seat shares were measured on the ratio scale. I then 
created a computation table similar to Table 1 which shows steps in calculating 
electoral volatility due to preference change. Next I inserted the party seat shares for 
elections at t and t+1 in columns (i) and (ii) respectively and indicated absent where 
a party did not participate in elections. I then calculated the difference between  
 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)  and 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 + 1) and inserted in column (iii). Column (iv) is half of the 
difference between seats obtained during the first and the second elections, and it 
shows the contribution of each party to the total electoral volatility. The totals for 
column (iv) is given by the formula  Σ [  1
  2
[𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 + 1)] which is actually the 
Pedersen index and shows the total electoral volatility. Up to Column (iv) therefore, 
52 
 
the computation for the Pedersen index is complete and from our example, electoral 
volatility is 70.  
Table 1: Calculating Electoral Volatility due to shift in Party Preference 
Note: Columns (i), (ii) and (v) as given information. Column (v) is not calculated. 
 
However, the Pedersen index measures total volatility and captures even those 
changes in seat distribution which have nothing to do with shifts in voter preference. 
Such changes that do not come about due to voter behavior include, for example, 
seat redistribution resulting from deserted seats which I have already explained. My 
next task therefore, was to eliminate any known components of the total electoral 
volatility that did not result from a shift in voter preference. For reasons already 
explained, I targeted deserted seats for elimination at this stage. I therefore 
established for each party, how many of the seats gained at t+1 are deserted seats 











due to ∆ 
Preference 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 + 1) 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 + 1)  1
  2
[𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 + 1)] 
𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑  (t+1) (iv)- (v) 
A 60 20 40 20 0 20 
B 20 Absent 20 10 Absent 10 
C 10 60 50 25 10 15 
D Absent 20 20 10 10 0 
E 10 0 10 5 0 5 
Total 100% 100% 140 70 20 50 
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20 and is the volatility due to deserted seats or the contribution of deserted seats to 
total electoral volatility. Electoral volatility due to voter preferences is 50, which is 




𝑖𝑖=1   |𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 + 1)|] which is 70 on the one hand, and the sum of column 
(v) or total deserted seats, Σ  [𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑  (t + 1)]  which is 20. In the final analysis therefore, 
I computed electoral volatility due to shift in voter preferences using the formula: 
Electoral Volatility = [ ∑  1
  2
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1    ( |𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 + 1)| ] – [ Σ𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛   | 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖  (t + 1)| ] 
This formula can be simplified and rewritten as follows: 
Electoral Volatility = [Σ𝑖𝑖=1  
𝑛𝑛  1
  2
 |[𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)]− [𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 + 1) + 2 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 + 1)|] 
where 𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑  are deserted seats. In using the formula above, as is the case with Pedersen 
index, [𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 + 1)] is read as the difference between seats received in the 
first and second elections, so that: [𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 + 1)] = [𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 + 1) − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)]. Since 
volatility cannot be negative, the greater of the two values, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 + 1), 
should be assigned the positive sign, while the smaller one should be negative. 
In Table 1, I have calculated the deserted seats by looking only at the parties that 
received those seats. However, it may sometimes be impossible to get details as to 
which parties received the deserted seats. Even then, it is still possible to get 
deserted seats by looking at the parties that supplied them. In Table 1, deserted seats 
= [Σ𝑖𝑖=1𝑛𝑛   [ 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖  (t + 1) ] =20, and were only supplied by party B. In effect therefore, 
the total deserted seats equals 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)  for party B which is the same figure appearing 
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in column (i) for party B. If there are more parties which shed off deserted seats, we 
add the number of seats held by all of them at  𝑡𝑡 and subtract from Pedersen index. 
One may ask why we have not treated party D the same way as B. The reason is that 
before a preference can be shifted, it must have been expressed in the first place 
and, once a preference is expressed, it can only be shifted at a date later than when it 
was expressed. In other words, whether a preference shift has occurred or not is 
assessed at t+1and not at t. Any party which participated in elections at t but not at 
t+1 such as B, can only give away its seats but has no chance of gaining a seat due 
to preference change among voters. However, if a party only participated at t+1 like 
party D then there is no doubt that the seats obtained were previously held by 
another party. Of course, the assumption here is that no additional seats have been 
created. There is therefore a possibility, however remote, that at least some of the 
seats acquired by such a party were held by one or more of the parties competing at 
t+1. In fact, in Table 1, it is apparent that besides winning 10 of the deserted seats, 
party D also won another 10 seats from a party that participated in elections at t and 
t+1. In other words, some voters shifted support from the party they had supported 
in elections at t to party D. There is no other way of referring to voters who 
supported another party at t  but supported D at t+1 when the other party was also 




It should be noted that more than half of the countries in this study did not have any 
deserted seats. Some of these countries include Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Gambia, 
Kenya, Tanzania and Namibia. Among the remaining countries, most of them have 
deserted seat values less than 7.0. However, there are a few countries with large 
deserted seat values such as Comoros with 38.9, Benin with 28.8 and Guinea with 
16.7. While the measure of volatility I have presented here can still be polished 
further, it is a more refined index of volatility due to shift in voter preference.  
iii. Key Independent Variable: Voters’ Living Conditions 
This study uses the Human Development Index (HDI) as the main indicator of 
aggregate living conditions. The choice of HDI is influenced by a number of factors. 
First, the GDP growth rate which has traditionally been used as an indicator of 
economic well-being is increasingly being viewed as providing an incomplete view 
of living conditions. In fact, ‘most economists acknowledge that GDP is not a 
complete measure of economic well-being. It omits many factors that affect quality 
of life’ (Loucks 1998:52). Second, it has been noted that sixteen out of eighteen, or 
89%, of the countries with the lowest volatility are those with the highest HDI (Katz 
and Crotty, 2006:209). This observation closely mirrors the theoretical expectation 
that higher living conditions are likely to breed lower volatility. 
Finally, HDI is considered to be broader than GDP and combines elements of both 
social-economic progress and quality of growth (Haq, 1995). The computation of 
HDI combines longevity or life expectancy; knowledge measured by adult literacy 
and the mean years of schooling; and living standard measured by percapita GDP 
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adjusted for purchasing power parity (Lindberg, 2006). This study used HDI data 
for the second election year for each country as reported in various United Nations’ 
Human Development Reports. In the case of Kenya, I used the HDI as given in The 
Third Kenya Human Development Report 2003. For South Africa, I used The South 
Africa Human Development Report 2003 and The Western Cape Provincial 
Economic Review and Outlook 2006. 
In addition, this study uses Rural Poverty Incidence, or the Headcount Index, as an 
indicator of living conditions at the constituency level in Kenya. As already stated, 
the use of poverty incidence rather than HDI is due to lack of data on the latter. The 
Headcount Index measures the percentage of the population of an area (in this case a 
constituency) with consumption levels below the rural poverty line. The poverty line 
is based on household consumption expenditures needed to obtain a ‘food basket’, 
based on a minimum nutritional requirement of 2,250 calories per adult equivalent 
per day. It also has a ‘non-food basket’ component, which includes a wide range of 
nonfood items like housing, transportation, education, and health. Regional price 
adjustments were applied to incorporate variations in regional cost of living14
In the case of South Africa, I also used unemployment as an additional indicator of 
living conditions. This was necessary since the provincial level analysis yielded a 
puzzle whereby provinces with relatively higher living standards tended to register 
. 
                                                 
14 World Bank. 2003. Poverty and Inequality: Geographic Dimensions of Well Being in 





high electoral volatility contrary to theoretical expectations. Fortunately, data for 
unemployment rates were readily available and were therefore used to corroborate 
the results obtained using the HDI.  
iv. Ethnic Cleavage  
In this study, ethnic cleavage is measured using Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization 
Index (ELF). ELF was developed by a team of Soviet Union researchers. It is a 
measure of the probability that if you randomly select two people in a given 
country, they will be from different ethnic groups. It ranges between 0 and, where 1 
is completely heterogeneous and zero is completely homogeneous. Higher ELF 
scores imply greater degree of ethnic fragmentation and vice versa. ELF is widely 
regarded in the literature as the best measure of ethnic fragmentation to date 
(Easterly and Lavine, 1997). Among scholars who have used it in the study of 
Africa include Arriola (2008). Ethnic fragmentation is given by the formula: ELF = 
1-∑ (𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
)2𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖   where m is the number of ethnic groups; 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖  is number of people who 
belong to the ith ethnic group; and N is the national population (Easterly and Lavine, 
1997).  I calculated the ELF for African countries from the CIA World Fact Book. I 
also calculated provincial and constituency/municipality-level ELF for Kenya and 





v. Voter Turnout 
I take voter turnout as the percentage of eligible voters who actually cast their votes 
during elections. Although specific eligibility requirements vary across countries, in 
many African countries, citizens who attain a certain age are eligible to register as 
voters. Voter turnout is taken as the percentage of registered voters who cast votes. 
vi. Political Freedom 
I define political freedom as the amount of space left between individuals and 
groups on the one hand and the coercive power of the state on the other hand. The 
greater the space between citizens and the coercive powers of the state, the freer the 
citizens. Political freedom has been widely used in empirical studies as a proxy for 
the level of democracy in a country (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Leduc, et al, 
2002; Ali and Isse, 2004; Lindberg, 2006). The latter used civil liberties alone as an 
indicator of the level of democratization in a society, and notes that, ‘the Freedom 
House Index is the most widely accepted as matching empirical’ reality (p. 102). 
Leduc, et al (2002) used the Freedom House Index rating of 1-3 as a basis for 
selecting the 58 electoral democracies which they studied. 
In this study, I used the Freedom House Index derived from the mean of political 
rights and civil liberties, each based on a 7-point ordinal scale. The Freedom House 
Index ranges from 1-7 where 1 is free and 7 not free. The index also has qualitative 
values so that 1- 3 is regarded as Free, 3.5-5.0 is Partially Free while 5.5-7 is Not 
Free. The Index is available for all countries annually.  
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vii. Electoral Systems  
I used electoral system to refer to the three key formulas used to translate votes into 
seats in Africa, namely, FPTP, proportional representation, and mixed system. Since 
k=3 in this case, I created two dummy variables (k-1), D1 and D2. I used FPTP as the 
base, while the proportional representation, and mixed system became D1 and D2 
respectively. The dummy variables, D1 and D2 were each dichotomized and coded, 0 
if a state lacks the electoral system corresponding to that variable, and 1, if it has it. 
viii. Concurrent Elections 
This is a dummy variable controlling for whether parliamentary and presidential 
elections are held concurrently, so that not concurrent = 0 and concurrent = 1. 
2.6 Data Collection and Analysis Methods 
i. Case Selection: Countries Selected for Cross-National Study  
African dynamics require very careful selection of cases for study, particularly if the 
conclusions are to be generalized to the continent, or even to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
There are regional patterns of institutional design and political culture that can affect 
results if case selection is biased towards one region. As regards electoral systems, 
Anglophone and Eastern African countries adopted plurality systems, while 
Francophone and Southern African countries adopted proportional systems (Stack 
and Lui 1999). Some scholars warn that ‘Africa is a vast continent and care must be 
taken not to overgeneralize. There is much variation between countries, both as 
regards their current situations and trends over time’ (White, et al, 2001:6). 
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As late as 1989, single party authoritarian regimes were still commonplace in 
Africa. However, from around 1990 a new wave of democratic renewal swept 
through the African continent so that by 1995, several African countries had already 
held at least one multiparty election. It is for this reason that the study focuses on 
two successive elections held between 1995 and 2005 in Sub-Saharan African 
countries. The idea was to get as many elections done as close to each other as 
possible. Since the study covers a ten year period, those countries that did not have 
two elections during this period were omitted from the sample. Countries in the 
Great Lakes and the Eastern African region were particularly affected by political 
upheavals. As a result, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo Republic, 
Burundi, Rwanda, Somali, Eritrea and even Angola did not hold two legislative 
elections during this period. Also left out are the so called ‘no party democracies’ of 
Uganda and Swaziland. Although Uganda held elections in 1996 and 2001, and 
Swaziland also held elections in 1998 and 2003, political parties were not allowed to 
participate in the elections. Uganda has since adopted multiparty democracy. In 
addition, there were countries that were left out because data of one kind or the 
other was not available. Although the countries were chosen on the basis of data 
availability, they spread across Africa and capture key variation in the continent. 
The 30 study countries are shown in Figure 2. The number of countries included in 
this study is larger than, and includes 18 of the 21 countries studied by Bogaards 




Unlike most past cross-national studies on electoral volatility that only select 
countries considered to be democratic, this study selected countries that have had 
two consecutive elections, regardless of their democratic credentials. In my view, 
selecting study countries on the basis of whether or not they are democratic amounts 
to selecting cases on dependent or independent variables as the case may be. 
Instead, I use a country’s level of political freedom as a variable and test whether it 
is a statistically significant determinant of electoral volatility.   
 
ii. Case Selection: Kenya and South Africa  
The greatest challenge that this study faced was data availability. The choice of 
Kenya and South Africa was first and foremost based on pragmatic considerations 
of data availability at levels below the state in a comparable format. Besides this, the 
two countries held their third elections since the rebirth of multiparty politics in the 
continent during the period under review. South Africa’s third all-inclusive elections 
were held in 2004, while Kenya’s third multiparty elections were held in 2002. Both 
elections are the focus of this study. While South Africa is the largest economy both 
in the Southern region, and in the whole of Africa, Kenya is the largest economy in 
Eastern Africa and by some estimates, the third largest in Sub-Saharan Africa 





The struggle for liberation from colonialism in the case of Kenya, and apartheid in 
the case of South Africa, were both violent. This helped to create dominant parties 
and leaders associated with these struggles. Kenya’s founding president, Jomo 
Kenyatta, was incarcerated for nine years, which was a third of the time Mandela 
spent in jail. Upon his release, Kenyatta capitalized on the heroic image arising from 
his role in the liberation struggle, to create and preside over an authoritarian regime, 
which was just as undesirable as apartheid. While the dominant ANC won the third 
election, KANU which had ruled Kenya since 1963, lost the third elections.  
 
In terms of electoral systems, Kenya uses a First-Past-the-Post System while South 
Africa uses list proportional representation. While Kenya is an outright unitary state, 
South Africa is a federal state with a national government as well as provincial and 
municipal governments (Hueglin and Fenna, 2006). In Kenya, both the legislature 
and the president are directly elected through universal adult suffrage, but in South 
Africa, votes are casts for political parties, which nominate legislators according to 
votes received. It is the legislators who elect the president.  
 
iii. Case Selection: Kenya’s 50 Constituencies  
As already mentioned, I used poverty incidence at the constituency level as an 
indicator of living conditions. Since poverty incidence data was only available at the 
Divisional level, I began by matching Divisions with their respective constituencies. 
This yielded close to 100 constituencies from which I selected fifty for this study. I 
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selected one constituency per district and two constituencies for the city of Nairobi, 
and larger districts like Mombasa and Machakos. After selecting the constituencies, 
I then calculated their electoral volatility scores.  
 
iv. Case Selection: Western Cape and its 17 Municipalities  
As already pointed out, Western Cape was selected for in-depth study because it had 
the highest electoral volatility in South Africa in 2004 and therefore could help in 
unlocking the South African puzzle explained in section 3. Given that it was not 
possible to get municipal level data for all the provinces, particularly for HDI, the 
Western Cape data that was available for 17 municipalities proved adequate. Data 
availability therefore, played a key role in case selection. 
 
v. Small Sample Size, Bootstrapping and Correlation tests 
This Study uses bootstrap15
                                                 
15Although I have included the other bootstrap texts used in the reference section, it is 
important to point out that the bootstrapping methods used here have been largely drawn 
from John Fox. 2002.  Appendix to An R and S-PLUS Companion to Applied Regression. 
 methods as well as multivariate and bivariate correlation 
tests. It is widely accepted that a bootstrap sample is as good as the original sample 
from which it is drawn. In fact, Hoyle argues that a good bootstrap is one whose 
sample distribution resembles the population distribution and that, ‘the larger the N, 
the more likely it is that the distribution of a sample resembles the true population 
distribution’ (Hoyle, 1999: 90). This raises questions about the lower limit threshold 
for N that can yield statistically significant results. I rely on the observation that ‘a 
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sample size of 30 is held by many to be the minimum number of cases if researchers 
wish to use some form of statistical analysis in their data’ (Cohen et al, 2003:93).  
In chapter three, which is a cross-national analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa, there are 
30 countries and hence the sample size stands at the threshold of what many 
scholars consider as the cut off for a large sample. Although ‘the bootstrap provides 
reliable statistical inferences for small samples, irrespective of the distribution type’ 
(Bardossy and Fodor, 2004: 35; see also Fox, 1999: 494), there is a tolerable limit to 
small sample size that can be meaningfully bootstrapped. Certainly when N=8 or 9 
bootstrapping may not be a viable option.  
In light of this, I had two options. First, I could increase the sample size. In the case 
of Kenya for example, the ‘first’ multiparty elections were held in 1992, and hence I 
could use 1992 as the base year and measure volatility for the 1997, 2002 and 2007 
elections. This would increase the sample size threefold from eight to twenty four. 
Although twenty four observations are still below the threshold of thirty, it would be 
feasible to do bootstrapping. However, while raw data from which electoral 
volatility can be calculated is available, the 1992 and 2007 living conditions data 
were not available. This option was therefore not used but would be recommended 
for anyone wishing to replicate this or undertake a similar study. 
The second option, which I adopted, was to simply use measures of association to 
test correlation at the provincial level and then seek modest constituency-level data 
(in the case of Kenya) or municipal-level data (in the case of South Africa) to test 
65 
 
robustness. This way if the association at the provincial level is strong and there is 
an equally strong causal link at the constituency or municipal level, we can be more 
confident that the relationships being tested exist. Consequently, for all correlation 
tests in this paper with N < 20, I have used two measures of association- Kendall’s 
w coefficient of concordance, and Pearson product moment correlation coefficient. 
The latter is computed using cor.test function, while the former is computed using 
Kendall.w function in the Concord Package16 in the R Program17
Pearson’s r measures the linear relationship between two variables and is useful 
when dealing with two quantitative variables measured at the interval or ratio scales. 
Its values ranges from -1 to +1 where +1 is a perfect positive linear correlation 
while -1 is a perfect negative linear correlation (Warner,2008). The decision to use 
Pearson’s r is based on several factors. First, ‘Pearson is the most widely used 
bivariate correlation statistic’ in the social sciences (Meyers et al, 2006: 107; see 
also Nachmias and Guerrero, 2006:287; Dalton, 2008: 262). Second, besides testing 
bivariate correlation, Pearson’s r enables us to determine how much variability in y 
can potentially be accounted for by a given x. In other words, ‘it is possible to test 
the significance of the correlation by transforming it to a t-distributed variable, 
. In addition, I 
have also used the test of difference of means and the test of proportions.  
                                                 
16 Lemon, Jim and Ian Fellows. 2007. Concord Concordance and Reliability. R Package 
Version 1.4-9. http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/concord/index.html. 
17 R Development Core Team. 2008. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical 
Computing. Vienna, Austria. ISBN 3-900051-07-0, URL: http://www.R-project.org. 
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which will be identical with the test obtained from testing significance of the slope 
of either the regression of x on y or vice versa’ (Dalgaard, 2002:107).  
Third, even though the statistical significance of a correlation depends on sample 
size, the latter only raises the threshold for the former so that with a very large 
sample size of 400 or more, statistical significance can be attained even when r= .11 
but ‘with a sample size as small as 9 we need a Pearson r of about .67 or better to 
achieve statistical significance at the .05 level’ (Meyers et al, 2006:114). Finally, it 
has been noted that Pearson’s r is fairly robust measure of correlation in the sense 
that the value of Pearson’s r is not significantly affected by modest violation of 
skewness, heteroscedasticity, or non-linearity (Sprinkle and Piercy, 2005). 
One advantage of Kendall W is that it is resistant to sample size, and works well 
even with samples of less than 7. In fact, when N > 7, then the value of 𝜒𝜒2  can be 
calculated and used to determine the significance of W (Kothari 2004: 309). The 
study expectation is that, if volatility is caused by a combination of HDI, ELF and 
voter turnout, then there should be a greater concordance in the ranking of the four 
variables across the eight provinces of Kenya. However, if none or only one of the 
independent variables is causally related to electoral volatility, then there should be 





CHAPTER III: CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF VOLATILITY IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA   
3.1 An Overview of Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa   
Sub-Saharan Africa refers to the whole of Africa except the northern countries of 
Egypt, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria, which have considerably different 
socio-cultural, political history and orientation (Lindberg, 2006). Cowen and Laakso 
(2002) argue that the rebirth of multiparty democracy in Africa in the 1990s, created 
a mistaken impression that elections are new and probably alien to Africa. Yet, 
more than a century and a half earlier, suitably assimilated Africans in Senegal were 
already voting for representatives in the French National Assembly by 1848. The 
first legislative elections in Anglophone Africa were held in the 1920s in Sierra 
Leone, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia and Nigeria. From 1946, Francophone Africa was 
allowed to vote, both for the French assemblies and the local governments. More 
elections were to follow in the 1950s in Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda. In fact, the 
1950s mark the first wave of democratization in Africa characterized by the struggle 
for independence (Lindberg, 2006).  
This seemingly impressive record notwithstanding, elections held in Africa before 
1945 were highly elitist and conducted mainly in key urban areas. Nonetheless they 
tended to be free and fair and the outcomes were never contested (Lindberg, 2006). 
African politics changed for the worse in the 1960s and 1970s with the emergence 
of military rule and civilian authoritarianism. Even then, ‘Uganda was the only post-
independence civilian regime to suspend elections altogether’ (Lindberg, 2006:10). 
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Even the worst of the African dictators knew the language of democracy and the 
utility of elections. At the height of Mobutu Sese Seko’s autocratic regime in Zaire 
(now Democratic Republic of Congo) in July 1977, he remarked that:  
I believe that the voice of the people is often stifled, and that we risk 
hearing it too late…the Zairian people, whose political maturity is no 
longer in doubt, must be able to express itself in complete liberty, and its 
voice must be accorded full legitimacy.18
 
  
In terms of scholarship on African elections, studies in the immediate independence 
era in the 1960s were concerned more with political mobilization and competition 
among parties and candidates as well as election outcomes. However, little attention 
was paid to the dynamics of the electoral process (Kasongo-Lumumba, 2005). By 
the 1970s, the initial enthusiasm with African elections had subsided partly due to 
the emergence of the one-party state and authoritarian regimes in many parts of the 
continent. More attention shifted towards trying to understand how the one-party 
state and the military regimes that dotted the continent functioned. In the 1980s and 
1990s, African elections were examined mainly through the lenses of ethnic voting 
theory, but in the 2000s the assumptions of the theory are being challenged. In the 
post-1990s, research on African elections has taken two forms. On the one hand 
there are those who focus on credibility of the elections and on the other hand there 
are those who focus on the voting patterns, voter behavior and the role of 
incumbents in elections (Kasongo-Lumumba, 2005). 
                                                 
18 Haywood Fred M. (ed.). 1987. Elections in Independent Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press. Page 187. 
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3.2 Model Estimation and Results 
In estimating a model of electoral volatility, I have included measures of living 
conditions (HDI), social cleavages (ELF) and political institutions and Systemic 
Variables (Electoral System, Election Timing and Political Freedom). The estimated 
model of electoral volatility is expressed by the following equation: 
Electoral volatility= α+β1 (Living Conditions)   
                                   +β2 (Ethnic Homogeneity)  
                                   + β3 (Voter Turnout)  
                                   + β4 (Electoral System) 
                                   + β5 (Election Timing) 
                                   + β6 (Political Freedom)        
                                      + 𝜀𝜀i  
Using the boot package in the R program, I obtained bootstrap statistics based on 
2000 iterations or bootstrap samples, as well as the associated Bias Corrected 
Bootstrap confidence intervals. The decision to use 2000 iterations was based on the 
advice in the literature that 95% confidence level requires minimum of 1000 





Table 2: Bootstrap Statistics for Robust Regression of Africa’s Electoral Volatility  
                                         Coefficient      Bias      Std. Error           BCa
Electoral Volatility                80.31          -0.37       14.19         (49.64,106.57) 
HDI                                    -101.13           0.07       17.22        (-139.7,-66.4) 
ELF                                        5.01             0.36        8.25         (-11.22,21.50) 
Voter Turnout                      -0.14           -0.00         0.13          (-0.39,0.12) 
Political Freedom                 -0.23            0.02         1.44          (-2.88,2.59) 
Mixed Electoral System       -2.33           -0.14        4.95          (-12.62,6.96) 
PR Electoral Systems           -0.95            -0.12       4.93           (-10.80,8.46)  
Concurrent Elections            7.12             0.06        4.13          (-0.65,15.60)
The bootstrap statistics as well as the Bias Corrected and Accelerated Bootstrap 
Confidence intervals (BCa) are constructed for 2000 Bootstrap Samples at 95% 
confidence level.  
 
Before substantively interpreting the results in Table 2, there are a few points worth 
noting. First, although I have reported only the BCa bootstrap confidence intervals, 
it is also possible to obtain the Normal and the Percentile confidence intervals using 
the bootstrap method. I choose BCa because it is more reliable when the original 
sample size is small as is the case with this study (Scheiner and Gurevitch, 2001). 
Otherwise, the results in Table 2 would not change regardless of which of the three 
confidence intervals is used in interpreting the results. Second, while the Huber 
Estimation of the Robust Regression returns the same intercepts and slopes that 
71 
 
would result from normal robust regression, it adjusts the standard errors to correct 
for the bootstrapped samples. The first column marked coefficients contains robust 
regression coefficients for the variables shown. These are the same coefficients that 
one would normally get in robust regression.  
3.3 Aggregate Living Conditions and Electoral Volatility  
There are several ways of interpreting the table. Using the standard errors and the 
estimated regression coefficients, it is clear that only HDI is statistically significant 
at the 95% confidence level. When the electoral volatility and HDI coefficients are 
taken together with their respective standard errors, the resultant t-score is greater 
than ±1.96 which is the threshold for 95% confidence level. On the other hand, the 
t-scores which result from the other variables are smaller than 1.96. On this account, 
therefore HDI is the only statistically significant determinant of electoral volatility.  
The second, easiest and perhaps, better way of interpreting the results is to look at 
the BCa confidence intervals. They show the range within which the true value of a 
given coefficient lies at 95% confidence level. If both the upper and lower limits 
have the same sign (both are positive as is the case with electoral volatility, or both 
are negative as in HDI), then the corresponding coefficient is statistically significant 
at the 95% confidence level. When the upper and lower limits have the same sign, it 
means that zero does not lie within the confidence interval and hence, we rule out 
the null hypothesis that the true value of the coefficient in question is zero.  Figure 1 
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gives a clearer view of the relationship between living conditions and electoral 
volatility in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Scatterplot of bootstrap replications of Africa’s Electoral Volatility and HDI Coefficients. 
The concentration ellipses are drawn at the 50, 95, and 99% confidence levels using a 
robust estimate of the covariance matrix of the coefficients.  
 
Figure 1 contains all pertinent information necessary to understand the relationship 
between HDI and electoral volatility. For example, it enables us to simultaneously 
see the confidence intervals at different confidence levels. Although we are satisfied 
with 95% confidence level, Figure 1 enables us to visualize the confidence intervals 
for a 99% confidence level. This way we are able to visualize the risk we take in 
accepting 95% as opposed to 99% confidence levels by looking at the cases that lie 
outside the 95% confidence interval (in the space between the last two outer 
ellipses). The 95% confidence interval for both HDI and electoral volatility are 
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represented by the second outer-most ellipses. Indeed, the confidence interval for 
HDI lies between the extreme right and left edges of the second outer most ellipses 
when read from the x-axis. It roughly ranges from -140 to -66. Similarly, the 95% 
confidence interval for electoral volatility is bounded by the extreme top and bottom 
edges of the same ellipse when read on the y-axis. Its approximate range is 50 to 
107. The center of the ellipse, where the vertical and horizontal broken lines meet, 
represents the intersection point for the estimated coefficients for HDI and electoral 
volatility. The estimated coefficient for HDI is the x-coordinate of the ellipse centre, 
which is the point at which the vertical broken line touches the x-axis (roughly -
101). Similarly, the estimated coefficient for electoral volatility is the y-coordinate, 
or the point at which the vertical horizontal line touches the y-axis (approximately 
80). These are the same coefficient estimates given in Table 2.  
Whichever way the results are interpreted, it is evident that HDI has a statistically 
significant influence on electoral volatility. The negative coefficient of the slope 
implies that the lower the living conditions of a country, the higher its electoral 
volatility and vice versa. In effect therefore, at higher levels of HDI, volatility is 
lower. This means that there is a strong and statistically significant relationship 
between living conditions and electoral volatility at a 95% confidence level. These 
findings show that aggregate voter behavior is closely tied to the living conditions at 
the given level of aggregation. Since the level of aggregation, and hence the unit of 
analysis, in this case is the nation, I argue that nations with better living conditions 
tend to have lower electoral volatility. 
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For substantive interpretation of these findings, we refer to Figure 2 which locates 
the 30 study countries in a scatterplot of HDI and electoral volatility. 
 
Data source: UNDP. 2006. Human Development Report 2006. Beyond Scarcity: Power, 
Poverty and the Global Water Crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, African Elections 
database, Adam Carr’s Election Archives among other sources as indicated in appendix 2. 
 
One observation from figure 2 is that, West African countries tend to have relatively 
lower HDI and higher electoral volatility. West African countries like Burkina Faso, 
Sierra Leone and Mali had the worst living conditions at the time of elections. Apart 
from Ghana, no other West African country had an HDI index higher than 0.5 and it 
is not surprising therefore, that they tended to record high electoral volatilities. In 
Southern Africa the story is the reverse. Namibia, South Africa, Botswana and 
Mauritius had high HDI and low electoral volatility. Mauritius which has one of the 
best performing economies in Africa has a complex party system known for regular 
formation and break up of coalitions. Together with Botswana and Gambia, they are 















































probably the only African countries which did not introduce single party 
authoritarianism even when there was the temptation to so do in the 1970s and 
1980s. The Eastern African countries of Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and 
Comoros have moderate HDI and moderate electoral volatility. The lowest HDI is 
Ethiopia’s 0.406, while the highest is Comoros’ 0.556. Similarly, their electoral 
volatility ranges from a low of 16.9 for Djibouti to a high of 36.9 for Ethiopia. 
The Central African region yields two noticeable patterns. The coastal parts of 
central Africa comprising Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cameroon and Sao Tome and 
Principe have better living conditions and lower electoral volatility. However, the 
landlocked Central African countries, comprising the Central African Republic 
(CAR) and Chad, have low HDI and exceptionally high electoral volatility.  
The Central African Republic for example, has been unstable with waves of 
democratic gains and reversals. The country had a record eleven coup attempts in 
the 1990s culminating in the 2003 overthrew of President Angie Felix Pattasse who 
had won the 1999 elections. Francois Bozize who led the coup then organized 
elections in 2005 which he won. In effect, there was a seven years lapse between the 
first election in 1999 and the second one in 2005, including a two-year military 
interlude. Although the military interlude did not change the party system, these 
developments altered the political landscape by the time of the second elections in 
2005. During the 2005 elections, Pattasse was barred from contesting. His party, 
Movement for the Liberation of Central African People (MLPC), fielded another 
76 
 
candidate, but the results saw a significant reduction in the party’s seats from 47 in 
1998 to 11 in 2005. Corresponding to this decline was the sudden increase in the 
number of seats won by independent candidates which rose from 7 in 1998 to 34 
(Wusu, 2006; Freedom House 2006). This may be an indication that most of the 
politicians loyal to Pattasse may have opted to contest the elections as independent 
candidates. These changes account for the extremely high volatility relative to HDI. 
3.4 Living Conditions, Political Freedoms and Electoral Volatility  
It will be recalled that the thirty countries studied, were not necessarily those with 
greater political freedoms. In fact, I argued that it is not proper to select cases for 
study based on either the dependent or independent variables. It is noteworthy that 
out of the 30 countries, Freedom House assessed 9 or 30% as Politically Free, 15 or 
50% as Partly Free and 6 or 20% as Not Free. I had two expectations with regards 
to political freedom. First, I expected that countries with greater political freedom 
would have greater electoral volatility. This expectation stems from the assumption 
that greater political freedom will guarantee free and fair elections and grant citizens 
the right to shift preferences at will. It would also allow for the formation of 
effective political parties which can campaign freely for electoral support.  
This assumption may intuitively seem contradictory to the stated study hypothesis, 
particularly if political freedom is assumed to be related to living conditions. It can 
be misconstrued to imply that countries with greater political freedom, and hence 
better living conditions, tend to have higher volatility. It is therefore important to 
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clarify that the link between political freedoms and living conditions in Africa is 
weak. First, if political freedom is strongly correlated with living conditions, then 
my regression model would run into multicollinearity problems, since the two are 
independent variables. To begin with, I tested for multicollinearity using Variable 
Tolerance (VT), which measures the amount of variability in a given independent 
variable that does not depend on other independent variables (Walker and Maddan, 
2009). The VT for political freedom is 0.57 which is a reasonable collinearity level 
given the cut-off of 0.25 suggested in the literature (Walker and Maddan, 2009).  
I also calculated the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) which measures the amount by 
which the correlation between a given independent variable and other independent 
variables inflates the standard errors of a regression coefficient. Although political 
freedom is the variable with the highest VIF of 1.75 in the model, this is far less 
than the most conservative cut-off of 4.0 suggested by Fox (2002) as well as Walker 
and Maddan (2009). This implies that the correlation between political freedom and 
other independent variables, including living conditions, inflates the estimated 
regression coefficients modestly and within tolerable levels.  
Second, I used Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient to test bivariate 
correlation between political freedom and living conditions. The test results are: r = 
- 0.332; df = 28; t = -1.864; p-value = 0.073; confidence interval range from - 0.619 
to 0.032; r2 = 0.110; and α = .05. It is noteworthy that the political freedom scale is 
constructed such that lower scores imply greater freedom and vice versa. Given that, 
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Pearson r = -0.332, there is a weak positive correlation so that greater freedom is 
correlated with better living conditions. However, the t- score, p-value and 95% 
confidence interval, show that the relationship is statistically insignificant. Indeed, 
political freedom accounts for only 11.0% of variability in living conditions.  
More substantively, figure 2 and table 3 show that, with the exception of Benin, the 
democratic states with low volatility enjoyed relatively good living conditions. At 
the same time, apart from Guinea, the authoritarian states with low volatility, were 
not doing badly either. For example, Equatorial Guinea, which is authoritarian, had 
the second best performing economy after Mauritius. While there are a number of 
democratic states in Africa with strong economies, there is no evidence, within the 
confines of this study, to suggest a strong correlation between political freedom and 
living conditions. Therefore, my expectation that countries with greater political 
freedom would have higher volatility does not contradict the study hypothesis. 
In the bootstrap robust regression, I used the numerical values of political freedom, 
which range from 1 to 7. The results presented in Table 2 demonstrate that, political 
freedom is not a statistically significant determinant of volatility. I also analyzed the 
relationship between political freedom and electoral volatility by measuring both 
variables at an ordinal scale. I measured the level of volatility in terms of deviations 
above and below the Africa-wide mean volatility, which I found to be 26.1. I treated 
volatility scores above the mean as high, and those below the mean as low volatility. 
I also measured political freedoms in terms of the qualitative values assigned to it by 
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the Freedom House- Free, Partially free and Not Free. The resultant distribution of 
countries studied is shown in table 3. 














Low   
Volatility 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Cameroon, Guinea,   
and Zimbabwe 
Gabon, Gambia, 
Nigeria, Djibouti, and 
Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Botswana, 
Sao Tome & Principe, 
South Africa, Ghana,   
Namibia, and  Benin 
 
 
High   
Volatility 
 
Cote d’Ivoire,  Chad 
Burkina Faso, Kenya, 
Sierra Leone, Malawi, 
Ethiopia, Zambia,  
Comoros, Central 
African Republic, 
Tanzania and Senegal  
 
Lesotho and Mali 
Data Source: This table has been constructed with data from Appendix 2 of this paper. 
To gain a clearer view of the relationship between political freedom and volatility, I 
treated the volatility scores for the nine democratic states and the six authoritarian 
states shown in table 3 as two separate samples. I then performed a test of the 
difference of the means19
                                                 
19 The tests of the difference of the means, which I have used here, as well as the tests of 
proportions, are useful alternatives to the tests of association which I have used in the next 
two chapters.  
. Since the sample size for each of the two categories of 
states are small, and different from each other (for democratic states N = 9, and for 
non-democratic states N = 6), the best method to use is the Welch two-sample t-test. 
From this test, t= -1.25, df=7.415, p-value = 0.249, and the observed difference in 




ranges from -33.826 to 10.257, and hence its upper and lower limits have different 
signs. This raises possibilities that the true difference in the means could be zero and 
hence, statistically insignificant. In any case, given that p-value = 0.249 > α = .05, I 
retain the null hypothesis that the difference between the mean electoral volatility 
for democratic and non-democratic states is not statistically significant.  
The second expectation was that the impact of living conditions on electoral 
volatility varies with the degree of political freedom. Figure 3, shows that whether a 
country is classified as free, partially free or not free, does not seem to affect the 
impact of living conditions on electoral volatility. That is, living conditions seems to 
determine volatility regardless of a country’s level of political freedom. 
 
Data source: UNDP. 2006. Human Development Report 2006. Beyond Scarcity: Power, 
Poverty and the Global Water Crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; African Elections 
database; Adam Carr’s Election Archives; IDEA International. 
Fig. 3: Political Freedom, HDI an   
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Figure 3 shows that, while ‘free states’ and ‘partly free states’ have nearly the same 
slope and intercept, the ‘non-free states’ have slightly higher intercept, and a steeper 
slope than the two. These minor differences notwithstanding, it can be inferred that 
the impact of living conditions on electoral volatility is generally stable in all the 
three shades of political freedoms. I rationalize this on grounds that the general 
political freedoms measured by Freedom House and other measures such as the 
Economic Intelligence Unit and Polity IV may not be manifested in the electoral 
process. Just as ‘voters are not fools’ (Key 1966:7), and ‘nonvoters are not fools’ 
(Ragsdale and Rusk 1993, cited in Goidel et al, 1999), I add that ‘authoritarian 
leaders are not fools’. Authoritarian leaders know when to act tough, how to cover 
their acts, and when to play to the gallery. Although they are hypersensitive to any 
threats to their hold on power, at least some do preside over relatively free and fair 
parliamentary elections as long as they are assured of winning enough legislative 
seats to transact business. This is what Lindberg (2006) refers to as, ‘[the] ostensible 
transformation of previously authoritarian rulers into democratic converts’ (p. 38). 
This should not be a surprise given that, even at the peak of authoritarianism in 
Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, there were some competitive legislative elections 
which yielded stunning legislative turnovers (Liebenow, 1986; Bratton and de Walle 
1997; Posner 2005; Lindberg 2006). Since the rebirth of democracy in Africa in the 
early 1990s, there has been a notable increase in political freedoms. It is reasonable 
therefore to suggest that parliamentary elections tend to reflect voters’ preferences. 
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In fact, despite violent protests in the flawed 2007 presidential elections in Kenya, 
there were no serious disputes over parliamentary elections.  
A possible counter argument to the one I have presented above, is that volatility in 
democratic and non-democratic states are shaped by different forces, and therefore, 
are not equivalent. Besides living conditions, it is possible that low volatility in non-
democratic states can result from suppressed political participation, stifled 
opposition, or outright manipulation of the electoral process. That is, elections in 
democratic states are free and fair, while those in non-democratic states are not, and 
hence, the two should not be lumped together in studies of volatility.20
                                                 
20 I hesitate to pursue the argument that elections in democratic states are free and fair, 
while those in non-democratic states are not. There are reservations on the standards used to 
judge African elections as free and fair. Indeed, Lumumba-Kasongo (2005) raises the 
questions: ‘what do “free and fair elections” mean in Africa? Who determines what is free 
and fair, and for what purpose?’ (p. 197). First, according to Lindberg (2006), free and fair 
elections are measured in terms of: opposition participation or boycott of elections, 
acceptance or rejection of the results by losers, and loss or win by the incumbent. Yet he 
concedes that incumbents sometimes loose, even when elections are not free and fair. Such 
was the case in Malawi’s 1999 and Cote de’Ivoire’s 2000 parliamentary elections, as well 
as Namibia’s 1989 Constituent Assembly elections. He also notes that some opposition 
parties boycott elections only when they realize they cannot win even fairly. Second, 
scholars like Muthien (1999) use survey questions seeking voters’ opinion on whether 
elections have been free and fair.  Given the high cost of information, it is doubtful if voters 
can objectively evaluate elections as free and fair. It is likely that voters who support 
winning candidates will judge elections as free and fair, even if they are not, and vice versa. 
Third, elections are at times declared free and fair on the basis of international observer 
reports. However, Cranenberg (2000) argues that, some observers lack expertise, are 
interested parties, and often use international standards which ignore the local context 
(Abbink and Hesseling, 2000). In this regard, Goodwin-Gil (2006) notes that, while it is 
easy to identify elections that are not free or fair, by looking for deviations from expected 
norms, it is not easy to identify a free and fair election, since the twin concepts lack ‘easily 
verifiable content’. To this, I can add that some forms of electoral fraud, with staid effects 





I note that, despite the regression analysis depicting political freedom as statistically 
insignificant, there were only nine democratic and six non-democratic states in the 
study. Hence, conclusions on the influence of freedom on volatility are modest and 
tentative. There is still room for a detailed pursuit of this line of research in Africa.  
3.5 Living Conditions, Electoral Systems and Electoral Volatility  
Past studies have produced mixed results with regard to the influence of institutional 
variables on electoral volatility (Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Vowles et al, 2002; 
Epperly, 2008). Vowles et al (2002), predicts a higher degree of volatility in the 
Fist-Past-The-Post (FPTP) as compared to the Proportional Representation system, 
(PR), and a much lower volatility in Mixed Systems. They argue that FPTP reduces 
the competitiveness of smaller parties, and hence reduces their chances of winning 
seats. However, in a study of post-communist Eastern Europe, Epperly (2008) found 
that mixed electoral system leads to high volatility. On the other hand, Mozaffar and 
Scarritt (2005) found that electoral systems have no influence on volatility in Africa.  
This study does not find any significant influence of electoral systems on volatility. 
In the bootstrap regression statistics in table 2, First-Past-the-Post was the baseline 
electoral system. The results suggest that electoral volatility in countries using either 
the proportional representation or a mixed system do not significantly differ from 
those that use FPTP. Since the parameters for the electoral system variables are not 
statistically significant, it is not useful to decompose our regression equation to 
substantively interpret its effect on volatility. Instead, I show in Figure 4 that the 
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impact of living conditions on volatility does not seem to be different under FPTP 
and PR electoral systems. For example, if the threshold is set at 5% and 10 million 
voters vote, a party will be required to get at least half a million votes to secure a 
seat. Smaller parties without cross-country support may therefore find it difficult to 
get seats. However, a small party with limited regional support can secure even up 
to ten seats with as few as 30,000 votes in countries like Zambia and Botswana 
where there are generally few voters per constituency. This would neutralize the 
effect of electoral system on electoral volatility. If anything, one can argue that the 
FPTP opens up the political space more by allowing for independent candidates who 
then trade off seats with parties in successive elections.  
 
Data source: UNDP. 2006. Human Development Report 2006. Beyond Scarcity: Power, 
Poverty and the Global Water Crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; African Elections 
database; Adam Carr’s Election Archives; IDEA International. Since there were only four 
countries with mixed systems, it made little sense to create a scatterplot for them. Instead I 
have merged them with the PR systems so that the comparison is essentially between the 
proportional and the non-proportional electoral systems. 
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Malawi’s 2004 elections provide an example in which voters showed a rare appetite 
for independent candidates. In Mangochi area of the southern region, independent 
candidates won eight of the eleven seats. For example, the Mangochi South West 
constituency attracted eleven candidates, out of which seven were independent. It is 
not surprising that therefore, that an independent candidate won the seat. In the 
national tally, independent candidates won 20% of all the seats, compared to 29% 
for the winner, Malawi Congress Party (MCP), and 26% for second placed, United 
Democratic Front (UDF) (Ott, et al, 2004). Much of the high electoral volatility in 
Malawi was therefore caused by independent candidates. This can be interpreted to 
mean that voters were somehow uncomfortable with the existing parties. To this end 
our findings support those of Mozaffar and Scarritt (2005). 
3.6 ‘Coat Tail Effect’ and Electoral Volatility  
Mozaffar and Scarritt (2005) and Birnir (2006), have noted that, when parliamentary 
elections are held closely after presidential elections, voters tend to be supportive of 
the president’s party. Holding parliamentary and presidential elections concurrently 
or close to each other creates a ‘coat-tail’ effect, which minimizes the chances of the 
smaller parties winning seats. However, when the two elections are held separately, 
smaller parties have better prospects of securing seats (Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005). 
I therefore expected that concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections would 
lead to relatively lower electoral volatility.  
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However, the regression results in Table 2 show that, concurrent elections do not 
yield substantively different volatility than non-concurrent ones. That is, whether 
presidential and parliamentary elections are held concurrently or not, does not seem 
to affect volatility. Neither does it alter the effects of living conditions on volatility. 
I also used the test of difference of means to detect whether ‘coat-tail’ effect affects 
volatility. In table 3, there are fourteen countries with high electoral volatility. Half 
of these countries elect the legislators and the chief executive (president or prime 
minister) concurrently, and the other half elect them separately. The Welch two-
sample t-test results are: t= -0.182, df = 11.76, p-value = 0.430, the 95% confidence 
interval for the test ranges from infinity to 7.70. For non-concurrent cases, N = 7, 
mean = 40.3, and for concurrent cases, N= 7, mean = 41.2. Although the observed 
difference in the two means is 0.9, this difference is not statistically significant 
given that the 95% confidence interval raises possibilities that the true difference in 
the means could be zero. At the same time, given that p-value = 0.430 > α = .05, I 
retain the null hypothesis that the difference between the mean electoral volatility 
for concurrent and non-concurrent elections is statistically insignificant 
3.7 Ethnic Fragmentation and Electoral Volatility  
The level of ethnic fragmentation ranges from as low as 0.006 in Lesotho to a high 
of 0.861 in South Africa, with a mean of 0.634. This means that Lesotho is an 
ethnically homogenous country in which nearly everybody is from the same ethnic 
group. South Africa on the other hand, is ethnically fragmented. On average, the 
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probability that two randomly selected people in Africa belong to different ethnic 
groups is 0.634, which confirms the arguments that Africa has a high degree of 
ethnic fragmentation. Using data in appendix 2, I can classify African countries into 
four categories based on ethnic fragmentation and volatility. First, countries with 
low fragmentation and low volatility include Botswana, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe and Mauritius. Second, countries with high volatility 
and high fragmentation are Zambia, Sierra Leone, and Chad. Third, countries with 
high fragmentation and low electoral volatility include Ghana, Guinea, Cameroon, 
Nigeria, South Africa and Gabon. Finally, countries with low fragmentation and 
high volatility are Burkina Faso and Lesotho. 
Contrary to the argument that high level of ethnic fragmentation increases electoral 
volatility, this study finds that the relatively high level of ethnic fragmentation in 
Africa does not have any statistically significant influence on electoral volatility at 
the national level. This is contrary to the arguments by Madrid (2005), who found 
that ethnic cleavage has a strong influence on volatility in Latin America. However, 
the findings confirm those of Tavits (2005), whose study of Eastern Europe found 
that ethnic fragmentation does not significantly influence electoral volatility. More 
substantively, the most likely reason why ethnic fragmentation in Africa does not 
affect parliamentary election outcomes is because, with the exception of key urban 
areas, most constituencies are inhabited by one dominant ethnic group. Therefore, 
even if voters are unhappy with the incumbent party or legislator, they are likely to 
replace them with another legislator from the same ethnic group in a different party. 
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3.8 Voter Turnout and Electoral Volatility  
The results show that turnout does not influence electoral volatility at the national-
level. There is no clear pattern in the relationship between turnout and volatility. 
There are countries with low turnout and low volatility (Zimbabwe, Gabon, and 
Nigeria), low turnout and high volatility (Mali and Cote d’Ivoire), high turnout and 
low volatility (Namibia, Equatorial Guinea, and Mauritius), and high turnout and 
high volatility (Tanzania, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia). This finding conform to 
several studies cited in Goidel et al (1999) such as De Nardo (1980), Bennett and 
Resnick (1990), as well as Gant and Lyons (1993). The studies found that voters and 
non-voters tend to have similar policy/candidate preferences, and hence failure to 
vote does not affect election outcomes. That is, turnout has no effect on volatility. 
3.9 Conclusion 
To this end, it seems that aggregate living conditions at the national level are the key 
determinants of volatility.  Ethnic fractionalization, political freedom, voter turnout, 
electoral system, and concurrent elections, do not seem to influence volatility in a 
significant way. There is however, a need to test these results at a slightly lower 
aggregate level than the state. In the next two subsections of this paper, I test the 
same economic voting hypothesis in country studies of Kenya and South Africa. 
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CHAPTER IV: CASE STUDY OF ELECTORAL VOLATILITY IN KENYA 
4.1 An Overview of Elections in Kenya     
Kenya was a multiparty state from the time of independence from Britain in 1963, 
until the only opposition party was banned in 1969. From 1969 to 1982, Kenya was 
a de facto one party state, which means that only one party existed although the law 
allowed the formation of many parties. After the failed coup attempt in 1982, Kenya 
became a de jure one-party state, and the formation of any other party besides the 
ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) was outlawed. It was not until 1991 
that multiparty democracy was restored. It is noteworthy that Kenya is one of the 
few African countries that have held elections every five years since independence. 
Even during the nine year authoritarian interlude (1982-1991) the country held 
elections on schedule.  Lewis (1998) has the following to say about Kenya during 
the one-party era: ‘Kenya is probably the most unrestricted of Africa’s one-party 
democracies, where elections regularly result in a high level of participation and a 
large turnover of elected politicians’ (Lewis, 1998:38).  
With the rebirth of multiparty politics in the early 1990s, the prospects of defeating 
KANU, which had been the ruling party since independence, became real. However, 
in line with the argument that it is very difficult to defeat incumbents (Gierzynski, 
2000), KANU won both the 1992 and 1997 elections. This meant that president 
Daniel Arap Moi, who had ruled the country for 24 years, completed his new two 
term limit and was not eligible for re-election in 2002. However, his handling of the 
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transition, particularly the imposition of a candidate on his party at the expense of a 
split, meant he had as much stake in the election as he would if he was a candidate. 
The 2002 elections were thus a watershed in Kenya’s political history as KANU lost 
to NARC, an opposition coalition formed just two months prior to the elections. The 
elections significantly redistributed legislative seats so that KANU’s seats were 
reduced from 108 to 68 while those of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) 
increased from 92 (which were won by its affiliates in 1997) to 125. Generally, 
legislative turnover reduced from 58.6% in 1997 to 43.8% in 2002 (Levy and 
Kpundeh, 2004). 
4.2 Provincial Level Data Analysis and Discussion 
Kenya has only eight provinces and hence for a study at the provincial level, N=8. 
Since this sample is small, it is inappropriate to use regression analysis. As already 
pointed out, I will use Kendall's W Coefficient of Concordance in a multivariate 
correlation analysis, and Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient r in a 
bivariate correlation analysis.  
i. Multivariate Correlation Analysis  
In this case, the number of observations (N=8); the sets of ranks (k=4) and the 
results of Kendall's coefficient of concordance for the four variables are: W= 0.713; 
df = N-1 = 7; 𝜒𝜒2 = k(N-1)*W= 19.95; and the p-value < 0.01. The critical value of 
𝜒𝜒2 when α =.05 and df=7 is 14.067. Since the observed value of 𝜒𝜒2 = 19.95, which 
is greater than the critical value, we reject the null hypothesis that the ranks are 
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independent of each other. Indeed, since W = 0.713, and p-value < 0.01< α = .05, 
there is a significant agreement in the ranking of the four variables. Therefore, HDI, 
ELF and voter turnout taken together, are strongly correlated with volatility. 
ii. Bivariate Correlation Analysis  
I use Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient to test bivariate correlation 
between electoral volatility on the one hand, and the HDI, ELF and Voter Turnout 
on the other hand.  The results are shown in Table 3 below.  




Correlation Significance of correlation  Variability  
 
Pearson’s r 95% Confidence 
Interval 
t-value p-value r2 
HDI -0.714 -0.944, -0.020 -2.501 0.046 0.510 
ELF -0.223 -0.802, 0.571 -0.562 0.595 0.050 
Voter 
Turnout 
0.012 -0.698,  0.711 0.030 0.977 > 0.1 
 
The first column gives the value of Pearson’s r showing the strength and direction 
of the correlation between each of the three independent variables and electoral 
volatility. For HDI, r = -0.714, which means that it has a strong negative correlation 
with electoral volatility. That is, higher levels of HDI tend to be strongly correlated 
with lower levels of volatility and vice versa. ELF on the other hand, has a weak 
negative correlation with volatility. This means that although greater fragmentation 
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is correlated with low volatility and vice versa, the relationship is weak. Similarly, 
high turnout is correlated with high volatility, although the correlation is very weak. 
Using the confidence intervals, it is apparent that only HDI is statistically significant 
at the 95% confidence level. There is a strong negative association between HDI 
and electoral volatility which means that higher levels of HDI are associated with 
lower levels of electoral volatility. However, this is not the case with ELF and voter 
turnout. In fact both have the upper and lower limits of their confidence intervals 
with different signs, meaning that zero is a possible true value of their respective 
coefficients. In essence, voter turnout and ethnic homogeneity of a province 
individually have weak and statistically insignificant bivariate correlation with 
electoral volatility. At the same time, the t-values and the p-values indicate that HDI 
has a significant correlation with electoral volatility, while ELF and turnout do not. 
The final column of Table 3 is the Pearson r squared or simply r2. It is the same 
coefficient of determination that we get in regression statistics. It shows the amount 
of variability in electoral volatility which can potentially be explained by each of the 
independent variables in a bivariate correlation. HDI can explain roughly 51% of 
the variation in electoral volatility, while ELF and voter turnout can only explain 
5% and > 1% respectively. Figure 5 shows the direct relationship between living 




Data Source: Electoral Commission of Kenya; Ministry of information and communication 
(Kenya): The European Union Observer Mission Report on Kenya’s 2002 Elections: The 
Third Kenya Human Development Report 2003. 
 
4.3 Constituency Level Analysis 
In this section, I look at the impact of living conditions on electoral volatility at the 
constituency level. Since Kenya has single member constituencies, volatility at this 
level can only be calculated in terms of change in vote shares among participating 
parties rather than seats as was the case in the previous sections. At the same time, 
since there is no constituency-level data on HDI, I use Rural Poverty Incidence or 
the Headcount Index as an indicator of living conditions. The fifty constituencies 
selected are spread across the country with the exception of North-Eastern Province. 
The results of the robust regression analysis are reported in Table 4. 
 


























Table 4: Robust Regression of Electoral Volatility21 
                                             Coefficients               t-value
Poverty Incidence                    0.806***                4.509     
                                                (0.179)      
Voter Turnout                         0.305                      1.586 
                                                (0.193)       
Intercept                                 -37.791*                -2.229 
                                                (16.951)     
Residual Standard Error           11.2 
N                                                50
 
 
Table 4 shows that poverty incidence is a significant predictor of electoral volatility 
in the 2002 elections so that as poverty incidence rise, volatility also increases. On 
the other hand, voter turnout is not statistically significant. The high volatility in 
constituencies with high poverty incidence is due to their tendency to limit support 
for KANU’s parliamentary candidates, even where the ruling party won. Although 
KANU won Mwatate, Sigor and Mt. Elgon, for example, which have high poverty 
incidence of 58, 54 and 53 respectively, its parliamentary votes declined by 10.0, 
19.3 and 11.3% respectively. However, although it lost Kandara and Gichugu with 
                                                 
21 The analysis on section 4.3 has been replicated in Appendix 6 using more up-to-date data 
obtained when the paper was virtually complete. The results are substantively the same. 
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low poverty incidence of 36 and 34 respectively, its parliamentary votes in the two 
constituencies increased by 12.2% and 7.1% respectively.22
4.4 Conclusion   
  
The provincial analysis had very few cases, tested correlation and not causation, and 
hence conclusions made from it are cautious and tentative. On the other hand, the 
constituency level analysis had sufficient cases, applied robust regression, but used 
poverty incidence as opposed to HDI to measure living conditions.  Nonetheless, it 
provides more credible results on account of sample size and methodology. Even 
though the cross-national analysis used bootstrap robust regression, the provincial 
analysis used correlation tests and the constituency analysis used robust regression, 
they all show that living conditions may have a significant influence on volatility. It 
seems that in countries, provinces or constituencies with low living conditions, the 
voters tended to blame either the government or the local leadership or even both. 
Where they felt that the national government is to blame, they punished incumbent 
parties by voting against its parliamentary candidates. Where they placed the blame 
on their local leaders, they voted against sitting legislators, whether from the ruling 
party or the opposition. Either way, there was greater redistribution of seats among 
parties after elections and hence higher electoral volatility. These findings largely 
support the findings of the Africa-wide study. 
                                                 
22 Electoral Commission of Kenya: http://www.eck.or.ke/index.php/Election-Results-
Database/ Accessed on July 8, 2009); and World Bank. 2003. Poverty and Inequality: 




CHAPTER V: CASE STUDY OF VOLATILITY IN SOUTH AFRICA  
5.1 South Africa’s Electoral System  
South Africa has a bicameral legislature comprised of the National Assembly and 
the National Council of the Provinces. The former has 400 members elected by all 
South Africans on the basis of proportional representation. The latter consists of six 
permanent and four temporary delegates from each of the country’s nine provinces. 
This translates into 90 members. It was set up in 1996 to replace the senate which 
had been created two years earlier.23
During elections, there is a flexible requirement that each party should submit two 
lists; a national and a provincial list. Of course, some parties chose not to submit the 
lists. Half of the National Assembly seats are distributed among the nine provinces 
on the basis of the total votes cast per province, and the other half on the basis of 
national votes. The number of votes needed to win a provincial seat is determined 
by the formula: 
 
Provincial Votes per Seat = 
Total  Valid  Provincial  Votes  Cast
Provincial  Seats +1
 + 1 ……… (i) 
After elections votes are first tallied at the provincial level and parties allocated 
seats according to votes received in the province using the formula: 
Provincial Party Seats =  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 𝑙𝑙  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙  𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃  𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠
Votes  Per  Seat
   ……………. (ii) 
                                                 





At this stage only whole numbers are considered and the remaining votes that do not 
get a seat at this stage are all treated as remainders. The remaining seats after using 
formula (ii) are then allocated to the parties on the basis of the largest remainders. If 
a seat or seats remain unallocated and the next party with the largest remainder does 
not reach the threshold of the provincial votes per seat, the ratios of votes to seats 
for each party is used to allocate the seat(s). Seats won by a party in each province 
are then added to determine each party’s provincial seat entitlement. A similar 
process is repeated at the national level using formulas (i) and (ii) and substituting 
provincial with national where applicable.24
5.2 Data Analysis 
  
In this section, I examine the influence of living conditions on electoral volatility in 
South Africa’s nine provinces. Although South Africa’s national electoral volatility 
score was calculated using party-seat shares, the provincial volatility was calculated 
using votes received by parties. For most countries, data on seats were more readily 
available than those on votes received. Therefore, to be able to compare South 
Africa with the other 29 countries, it was necessary to use seats rather than votes. 
Similarly, since proportional representation allocates party seats proportional to the 
votes, there is very little difference in electoral volatility calculated using seats and 
votes. Supporting this notion, Mozaffar and Scarritt (2005) observe that South 
Africa and Namibia have the lowest disproportionality index in Africa. They 
                                                 





attribute this to the fact that the two countries use purest proportional representation 
formulas - Droop and Hare respectively. They found that on average, the share of 
votes for the largest party in South Africa is 66.2% while the share of seats for the 
same party is 66.4%. In Namibia, the average share of seats for the winning party is 
69.0% while average share of votes is 69.3% (Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005).  
Just as with Kenya, South Africa has a small number of provinces (nine), rendering 
regression analysis problematic. I used Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance W, to 
test the overall degree of association between electoral volatility, HDI, ELF and 
voter turnout. In addition, I use Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient r 
to test bivariate correlation between the four variables. 
i. Multivariate Correlation Analysis  
In this analysis, the number of observations (N=9); the number of ranks (k=4) and 
the results of Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance for the four variables are: W= 
0.91; df = N-1 = 8; 𝜒𝜒2 = k(N-1)*W= 29.79; and the p-value > 0.01. Given that df=8; 
and α =.05, the critical value of 𝜒𝜒2 =15.507. Once again, the observed value of 𝜒𝜒2 
(29.79) is greater than the critical value, and hence we reject the null hypothesis that 
the ranks are largely independent of each other. Just as in the Kenyan case, the p-
value of > 0.01 shows that there is a statistically significant difference between the 
discordant and concordant ranks. We therefore conclude that when HDI, ELF and 




ii. Bivariate Correlation Analysis  
The results of the bivariate correlation test between HDI, ELF, voter turnout and 
electoral volatility are shown in Table 5.  
Table 5: Pearson r Tests for Electoral Volatility and Key Independent Variables  
Independent 
Variables 
Correlation Significance of correlation 
 
Variability 
Pearson r 95%Confidence 
Interval 
t-value p-value r2 
HDI 0.905* 0.605, 0.980 5.642 0.001 0.819    
 
ELF    -0.039 -0.685, 0.642 -0.103 0.921 0.002 
 
Voter Turnout -0.760* -0.946, -0.194 -3.097 0.017 0.578 
 






























5.3 Study Findings 
Table 5 shows that living conditions measured both in terms of unemployment rates 
and HDI are statistically significant. It seems that unemployed Coloureds25
                                                 
25 I use the phrases, ‘Coloureds’, ‘Whites’ and ‘Blacks’ cautiously, to refer to three of the 
post-apartheid South African communities. Any discomfort caused by the use of these 
phrases, is regretted. This analysis does not include other South African communities, such 
as the Asians, due to lack of data. Although, I am conscious of the fact that neither Blacks 
nor Coloureds are homogeneous, these broad categorizations are sufficient for this study. 
 are more 
likely to shift preference and support a different party. This could be the reason why 




had high volatility despite better living conditions. Voter turnout also has a strong 
correlation of -0.760 with volatility. However, the correlation between volatility and 
ELF is weak. The question that one may ask is whether these levels of correlation 
are statistically significant. It will be recalled that sample size affects the 
significance of r so that smaller samples such as the ones for the South African 
provinces may have large correlation coefficients even when they are not 
statistically significant. Columns 2, 3 and 4 in Table 5 address the question of 
statistical significance of the correlations. The confidence interval, t-values and p-
values show that South Africa’s provincial living conditions and voter turnout are 
all correlated with the provincial volatility. Table 5 also shows that HDI accounts 
for the highest variability of 81.9% followed by unemployment. Voter turnout and 
ELF respectively account for 57.8% and 0.2% of the variability in volatility. 
I expected that provinces with low voter turnout would be likely to record high 
electoral volatility. It is possible that in such provinces, the voters have very little to 
cheer about and many of them opt not to vote. Those who votes are motivated more 
by the desire to ‘throw out the rascals’. A closer look at the 2004 South African 
election results shown in the appendix reveals that Western Cape Province, which 
had the highest electoral volatility of 40.7, had by far the lowest voter turnout of 
42.6%. On the other hand, North-Western Province which had the highest voter 
turnout of 89.3% had a low electoral volatility of 8.1. 
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Perhaps more important, the table confronts us with a real puzzle. Contrary to our 
theoretical expectation, provinces with high HDI tended to record high volatility and 
vice versa as shown in Figure 6. The puzzle then is: why did provinces with high 
HDI register high volatility while those with low HDI experience low volatility? 
Data Source: Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa. South Africa Human 
Development Report, 2003.Electoral volatility calculated by the writer.  
 
5.4 South African Puzzle: A Protest by the Rich? 
One of the possible explanations for the South African puzzle, where provinces with 
higher living conditions tend to register higher electoral volatility contrary to our 
expectations, is that the rich provinces are angry with African National Congress 
(ANC) for not paying as much attention to them as it does to poorer provinces. 
Besides the fact that increase in HDI leads to increase in electoral volatility in South 
African provinces, it is also apparent that provinces with less support for the ANC 



























tended to record higher electoral volatility and vice versa. Intuitively therefore, the 
better the living conditions in a given province, the less support it accorded ANC 
and the higher its electoral volatility in 2004.  
Against this background, I explore the possibility that the provinces with relatively 
high HDI are registering high electoral volatility due to a decline in their living 
conditions. In other words, although Western Cape and Gauteng have the highest 
HDI and are economically better off than the other provinces, they could be 
experiencing a decline in living conditions. Similarly, given South Africa’s history 
of racial bigotry and uneven development, ANC adopted pro-poor policies to rectify 
these anomalies. One such policy is the Black Economic Empowerment built on the 
idea of ‘empowerment of the poor’ through ‘democratic redistribution of wealth’ 
(Bramble and Barchiezi, 2003). It is possible that these policies adopted by ANC in 
an attempt to address the regional disparities are inviting the wrath of the people in 
the relatively rich provinces. In fact, in an interview with the BBC just before the 
2004 elections, one of the respondents from Kwazulu Natal province observed that:  
It would be fantastic if the ANC were voted out. But by the time that 
happens we’ll already have a Mugabe-type situation. Has ten years 
made a difference? If you talk to the average white person they will 




                                                 




To appreciate these remarks, one needs to remember the incredible socio-economic 
transformation that has taken place in South Africa since 1994. It is estimated that in 
1995, about three-quarters of the richest 10% in South Africa were whites, but by 
2000, the number of African households in the richest top 20% had matched that of 
the whites. At the same time, the distribution of national income was skewed in 
favor of blacks so that by 2004, it is estimated that 27% of black Africans in formal 
employment had entered the South African middle class (Buhlungu et al, 2007). 
Against this background, I expected that the provinces which registered higher HDI 
in 2004 were in fact doing much better in the past years. However, our analysis of 
the living conditions trends (measured by HDI) across the nine provinces over time 
shows that the gaps between the relatively rich and the poorer provinces have not 
changed significantly since 1999. There is therefore, no reason for the latter to feel 
edgy about the economic reforms by the ANC government. Between 1999 and 
2004, HDI declined every year across all the provinces. The actual rate of decline in 
HDI was fairly uniform across the provinces. A close look at the 2004 South 
African Human Development Report show that between 2003 and 2004, Gauteng, 
Kwazulu Natal, Mpumalanga and North-West all experienced a 0.011 decline in 
their respective HDI. The HDI for both Eastern Cape and Free State provinces 
declined by 0.009. In fact, Western Cape which has the highest HDI had the least 
decline of just 0.002. Yet it is Western Cape which had the highest electoral 
volatility as shown in Figure 6. It is therefore not true that provinces with high HDI 
in 2004 were experiencing disproportional decline in their economic conditions.  
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5.5 Unlocking the South African Puzzle: The Case of Western Cape Province 
To unlock the South African puzzle, I examined the economic conditions and voting 
patterns in Western Cape. The choice of Western Cape was based on the fact that it 
had the highest electoral volatility in the country as shown on Figure 6. Similarly, it 
is only in Western Cape Province where the New National Party (NNP) won in the 
1994 elections. NNP is the successor to the former ruling party, Nationalist Party 
(NP) which introduced apartheid in South Africa. Its victory in Western Cape 
Province was attributed mainly to the Coloured voters who provided a significant 
support for the party (Tihany, 2006:17). A closer look at Western Cape will enable 
us to get an idea of what is driving electoral volatility in South Africa and why at 
the provincial level we seem to get results that confound our hypothesis. 
I begin with two sets of possible explanations for the South African puzzle. First, 
increased electoral volatility in areas which are less supportive of ANC is due to the 
fact that those areas are now warming up to ANC. It is possible that provinces 
which have relatively higher HDI disproportionately benefited in the apartheid era, 
and were therefore initially not receptive of ANC. These areas could be warming up 
to the ANC after realizing that the party means well for all South Africans. Second, 
it is also possible that anti-ANC voters are shifting to other opposition parties in 




I began by examining the impact of living conditions on electoral volatility in 17 
selected municipalities within Western Cape. Selection of the municipalities was 
based on availability of data primarily data on HDI. Since the sample size is small, I 
once again use Kendall’s W and Pearson r.  
In the case of the Western Cape municipalities, the number of observations, N=17; 
the number of ranks, k=4 and the results of Kendall's coefficient of concordance are: 
W= 0.911; df = N-1 = 16; 𝜒𝜒2 = k(N-1)*W= 58.30; and the p-value > 0.01. Given 
that df=16; and  α =.05, the critical value of 𝜒𝜒2 =26.296. Since the value of 𝜒𝜒2 = 
58.30 and is greater than the critical value, I rejected the null hypothesis that the 
ranks are independent of each other. We conclude that HDI, ELF and voter turnout 
are strongly correlated with electoral volatility in a statistically significant way. As 
before, we undertake a bivariate analysis of the variables as shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Pearson r Tests for Electoral Volatility, HDI, ELF and Voter Turnout for 
Western Cape 17 Cases. 
Variables Correlation Significance of Correlation  Variability 
  





HDI -0.615 -0.846, -0.191 -3.022 0.009 0.378 









Table 6 shows that HDI has a strong negative correlation with electoral volatility 
which means that higher levels of HDI are correlated with lower volatility and vice 
versa. Relatedly, municipalities with greater concentration of the Coloureds tend to 
have higher volatility and vice versa. However, there is a weak positive correlation 
between voter turnout and volatility, which implies that although municipalities 
with higher voter turnout tend to register higher volatility, the relationship is weak. 
Similarly, the upper and lower confidence limits for HDI and Coloureds have the 
same signs (negative in the case of HDI and positive in the case of Coloureds). As 
already explained, this implies that the bivariate correlations between volatility and 
HDI as well as Coloureds are both statistically significant. However, when it comes 
to voter turnout, the lower confidence limit is negative while the upper limit is 
positive. This means that there is a possibility that the true value of the correlation 
coefficient is zero and hence the correlation is not statistically significant.  
Contrary to the results at the provincial level, the HDI correlation coefficient at the 
municipal level is negative which means that municipalities with lower HDI in 
Western Cape province tend to register higher electoral volatility and vice versa. In 
other words, municipalities with worse living conditions are associated with higher 
electoral volatility. This finding is in line with the study hypothesis. This means that 
there could be other factors at the provincial level in South Africa, which artificially 
destabilize electoral volatility. Figure 7 shows the location of the 17 Western Cape 
municipalities selected for this study in a scatterplot of HDI and electoral volatility. 
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Data Source:  The Provincial Treasury (Provincial Government of Western Cape).  The 
Western Cape Provincial Economic Review and Outlook 2006; Independent Electoral 
Commission of South Africa. 
 
Next, I examine changes in the level of support for the three main parties in Western 
Cape in the 1999 and the 2004 national elections. Figure 8 shows the percentage of 
votes lost or gained by the three major parties in Cape Province. Although the figure 
gives data for the districts, I actually did the analysis at the municipal level which is 
below the district. However, to present a less crowded figure, I have condensed the 
17 municipalities into their respective districts for visual clarity. Appendix 1 shows 
which of the 17 municipalities belong to which district shown in Figure 9. 






































Data Source: Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa  
 
Figure 9 suggests that much of the electoral volatility in Western Cape is due to 
realignment within the opposition characterized by change in support for the New 
National Party (NNP). Contrary to the expectation that ANC gained from these 
losses, it is actually the Democratic Alliance (DA) which gained more from NNP 
losses. It is only in West Coast and West Karoo districts where ANC support 
increased considerably. This confirms the second hypothesis for the South African 
puzzle that areas which were initially not receptive of ANC are shifting support 
among opposition parties in search of a credible and viable option to ANC.  
The foregoing discussion begs the question: Why did voters in Western Cape punish 
NNP? Our theory rests on the assumption that it is the incumbents who are either 
rewarded or punished. It turns out that NNP was in many respects the incumbent in 
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Western Cape. In the 1999 provincial elections, ANC won 42.1% of votes, while 
NNP and the Democratic Party (DP) got 38.4% and 11.9% respectively (Reynolds, 
1999). Since the elections did not produce an outright winner, NNP and DP formed 
Democratic Alliance (DA) as a coalition government, headed by a DP Premier. 
However, in June 2002, NNP pulled out of the coalition and formed a new coalition 
with the ANC, headed by its premier. In 2004, NNP contested the Western Cape 
election as a coalition partner with the ANC (Knight, 2004). In effect, it did not 
offer the electorate anything substantially different from the ANC.  
This brings us to the question about how voters apportion rewards and punishments 
in coalition governments. There are at least three reasons why NNP may have been 
singled out for punishment. First, it is the only party that was in government 
throughout the five years between the 1999 and the 2004 elections. Second, it held 
the premier’s position up to the election time. Since the economy of Western Cape 
like in the rest of South Africa declined during this period, voters’ anger could be 
understandable. Third, NNP had formed a coalition with DP aimed at keeping ANC 
out of Western Cape and hence the very act of deserting DP to work with the ANC 
alienated it from the crucial anti-ANC voters in Western Cape. It could no longer be 
trusted to provide a credible alternative to the ANC. 
In fact, the study established, as shown in Figure 10, that the anti-NNP scenario in 
Western Cape was replayed throughout the country. It is apparent that provinces 
like Western Cape and Northern Cape which had the highest electoral volatility are 
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actually the ones in which NNP had won a substantial share of votes in the 1999 
elections. With the exception of Kwazulu Natal and Eastern Cape provinces where 
ANC was a major benefactor in the shifting party support, the Democratic Alliance 
was the major beneficiary in the remaining seven provinces.  
Figure 9: Changes in Party share of votes in South African provinces (1999-2004) 



































5.6 Conclusions  
On the surface, the analysis of electoral volatility in South Africa yields mixed 
results. At the municipal level there is a strong negative relationship between HDI 
and electoral volatility as predicted by our theory. However, at the provincial level, 
the relationship is reversed so that provinces with relatively better living conditions 
are reporting higher electoral volatility and vice versa. Figures 9 and 10 suggest that 
there is strategic realignment against the NNP. In Western Cape, the disaffection 
with the NNP was greater given that it was part of the two ruling coalition 
governments formed between 1999 and 2004. It is apparent that throughout the 
country, the provinces which had greater support for NNP in 1999 were reporting 
high volatility as voters desert it for the DA. It seems that the party’s decision to 
walk out on its coalition partner, DA and form a coalition with ANC in 2002 was a 
political miscalculation which alienated it from its core constituencies in the whole 
country. It is hardly surprising that the party eventually dissolved in April 2005 
(Freedom House, 2006). This illustrates my argument that the elites are unlikely to 
dissolve a party unless its support base is considerably weakened. Although it seems 
that the alignments were at the political party level, it is clear that voters were at the 






CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTION 
6.1 Integrating Key Study Findings 
A key strength of this study lies in the richness of its methodology. On the one hand, 
the study fuses cross-national aggregate data for 30 Sub-Saharan African countries, 
with provincial and constituency/municipal-level aggregate data for Kenya and 
South Africa. This multilayered approach enables us to check variation in the 
correlation between electoral volatility and living conditions at different levels of 
aggregation. The study also uses different analytical tools- bootstrap methods, 
Kendall W and Pearson r. The strength of this approach is that it enhances the 
robustness of the findings. Since the analysis at the national level yields consistent 
results with those at provincial and the constituency/municipal levels, despite the 
difference in aggregation levels and methodology used, I have more confidence in 
the robustness of the findings.  
This section ties together the findings of the study. The overriding concern is 
whether, given the findings of the study up to this point, we can conclude that living 
conditions in sub-Saharan Africa affect volatility. I use t-values to determine the 
significance of the correlations between volatility and other key variables.  
HDI was the key variable used to measure living conditions. However, due to lack 
of data at the constituency level in Kenya, I used Poverty Incidence. At the same 
time to be sure that the South African puzzle is not due to the use of HDI, I also 
used Unemployment as an alternate indicator of living conditions. The study shows 
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that living conditions, whether measured in terms of HDI, Unemployment or 
Poverty Incidence, have a significant influence on electoral volatility. In the Kenyan 
constituencies, it is noticeable that as poverty incidence in a constituency rises, 
voters are more likely to shift support from one party to another, leading to higher 
volatility. It is apparent that better living conditions are strongly correlated with low 
electoral volatility except at the provincial level in South Africa.  
The robustness of the findings is further demonstrated by the fact that the South 
African provincial-level puzzle persists whether HDI or Unemployment is used to 
measure living conditions. The sample size notwithstanding, it is not surprising that 
the South African provinces with lower HDI and those with higher unemployment 
rates tend to register low volatility. At the same time, provinces with relatively high 
concentration of unemployed Coloureds tend to have higher volatility. It is thus 
understandable why Western Cape Province, with high concentration of Coloureds, 
has both the highest living standards and the highest volatility in South Africa.  
Besides the unique position of the Coloureds in South Africa, there is no strong 
evidence of ethnic fragmentation influencing electoral volatility. In both the cross-
national analysis and the Kenyan case study, the t-value for ethnic fragmentation is 
weak. As is the case with the South African provinces, it is noticeable that the 
municipalities in Western Cape Province with relatively greater concentration of the 
Coloureds such as Laingsburg, Beafort West, Bergriever and Cederberg, registered 
relatively higher volatility. It is clear from Appendix 1 that the lowest concentration 
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of Coloureds in the 17 Western Cape municipalities studied are in Overstrand and 
Knysna, where they respectively constitute 37.3% and 44.1% of the population. The 
two municipalities also had relatively low volatility scores of 19.8% and 18.9% 
respectively. However, it must be remembered that the Coloureds are not a distinct 
ethnic group but a race in search of self identity. 
Relatedly, party systems and institutional variables are only testable at the cross-
national level. Indeed, cross-national variables such as political freedoms, electoral 
rules and party systems, are reduced into constants once the focus shifts to a single 
country. Political freedoms and concurrent elections had very weak t-scores. At the 
same time, the high electoral volatility in Western Cape Province and indeed, the 
volatility scores in all the South African provinces seem to have been inflated by a 
shift in voter preference from the New National Party (NNP) to the Democratic 
Alliance (DA).  The t-value for NNP is -4.945 which is not only very high but is 
also indicative of the fact that as support for NNP declines, volatility increases. On 
the other hand, the t-value for DA is 2.301 which imply that as support for DA 
increase, so does electoral volatility. When these two observations are taken 
together, it implies that as support for NNP declined, that of DA increased. In effect, 




6.2 Implications of the Findings for the Investor-Voter Model 
One of the key assumptions of the Investor-Voter Model which drives this study is 
that investor-voters are only loosely attached to political parties and that they can 
easily shift party preference if dividends are not forthcoming from their investment. 
This study has unearthed several ways in which loose attachments to party affect 
electoral volatility. First, when investor-voters are dissatisfied with the party in 
which they last invested their votes, they can shift not only to other parties, but can 
also shift support towards independent candidates as happened in Malawi in 2004.  
Second, dissatisfied investor-voters may also become apolitical and refuse to vote as 
happened in Western Cape Province where only 42.6% of the voters turned out to 
vote as compared to the second lowest turnout of 64.4% in Mpumalanga. The other 
seven provinces had turnout ranging from 73.5% in Kwazulu Natal to 89.3% in 
North West. The few voters who turned out to vote in Western Cape apparently did 
so to ‘throw out the rascals’ as already discussed in the last chapter. The same cast 
was reenacted during Namibia’s 1998 local authority elections where the national 
voter turnout was a paltry 34%. In fact some observers have noted that during those 
elections, the main opponent of the ruling party was not the opposition parties, but 
apathy. The low turnout was partly because in some case voters felt that ‘the 
candidates lacked leadership qualities’ and therefore voters ‘could not see what 
difference voting would make, because they still face the same problems like poor 
education and unemployment’(Cowen and Laakso, 2002:204). 
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Similarly, although the study did not rely on voter’s accounts of what motivates 
them to vote as they do, it has established an aggregate voting pattern whereby 
states, provinces, constituencies, and municipalities with poor aggregate living 
conditions, tend to record very high electoral volatility and vice versa. However, 
these aggregate units do not vote; it is the individuals residing in the units who 
actually cast their ballots in a way that produce high or low volatility. The fact that 
aggregate election results correlate well with aggregate economic variables like HDI 
and poverty incidence in different areas suggest that voters are conscious about the 
state of the economy.  
6.3 Conclusions 
This study set out to investigate the impact of voters’ aggregate living conditions on 
electoral volatility. To do so it was necessary to address two major deficiencies from 
which studies on economic voting have suffered.  First, I have presented a refined 
concept of electoral volatility which isolates the share of deserted seats from the 
Pedersen index of electoral volatility. I believe the resultant index reasonably 
captures volatility due to shifts in voter preference. Second, I have lifted the lid on 
the economic voting black box, and identified voters and not institutions or social 
cleavages as what gives form and substance to electoral volatility. In other words, 




On the surface, it would appear that this study has unearthed mixed findings. At the 
cross-national level it is clear that countries with relatively better living conditions 
tend to register lower electoral volatility and vice versa. This finding is replayed at 
the provincial and constituency level in Kenya. However, the relationship between 
living conditions and volatility at the provincial level in South Africa is strong but in 
the reverse direction so that as HDI increases, electoral volatility also increases and 
vice versa. A close examination of Western Cape Province which had the highest 
electoral volatility in South Africa showed that municipalities with relatively better 
living conditions reported lower volatility as our theory predicts. It turns out that the 
provincial volatility in South Africa is exaggerated by the strategic realignment 
among anti-ANC voters as they abandon the NNP for DA. This realignment is also 
economically-driven and thus the hypothesis holds even in the case of South Africa. 
6.4 Directions for Future Research 
This study relied on anecdotal evidence from African countries such as Lesotho and 
Botswana, which shows that change in the electorate’s composition, does not affect 
volatility. It is possible that the anecdotal evidence relied on are biased rather than 
representative of the continent. Therefore, there is need for systematic investigation 
on whether change in the composition of voters affects election outcomes. 
There is still a need to determine whether there is any substantial difference between 
sociotropic and egotropic voting. In this study we have focused on broad economic 
voting, due to the aggregate nature of the study. It is possible that there is a strong 
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correlation between the two, so that those, whose individual living conditions are 
good, evaluate the national economy to be doing well and vice versa. 
Still, it is important to establish why some people living in abject poverty would 
support incumbents while others enjoying good living conditions would reject the 
incumbents. This is prompted by the provincial level results in South Africa. In fact, 
it would be good to replicate the South African study at the precinct level.  
The problem of data availability notwithstanding, this study has presented strong 
evidence of economic voting and its influence on electoral volatility in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The study does not claim to have conclusively addressed causes of volatility, 
but it provides a useful conceptual, theoretical and methodological seedbed and thus 













Abbink, Jon and Gerti Hesseling. (eds.). 2000. Election Observation and 
Democratization in Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Ali, Abdiweli M. and Hodan Said Isse. 2004. ‘Political Freedom and the Stability of 
Economic Policy’. Cato Journal 24 (3) (Fall). 
Alwy, Alwiya and Schech, Sussane. 2004. ‘Ethnic Inequalities in Education in 
Kenya’. International Education Journal   5(2).  
Anderson, David M. 2003. ‘Briefing: Kenya’s Elections 2002-The Dawning of a 
New Era?’ African Affairs. 102:331-342 
Arriola, Leonardo R. 2008. ‘Ethnicity, Economic Conditions, and Opposition 
Support: Evidence from Ethiopia’s 2005 Elections’. Northeast African Studies 
10(1):115-144  
Bardossy, Gyorgi and Fodor Janos. 2004. Evaluation of Uncertainties and Risks in 
Geology: New Mathematical Approaches for their Handling. Springer.  
Bartolini, Stefano and Peter Mair. 1990. Identity, Competition and Electoral 
Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates 1885-1985. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Basedau, Matthias, Gero Edman and Andreas Mehler (eds.). Votes, Money and 
Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa. Uppsala: Nordic 
African Institute.  
Baudais, Virginie. and Enrico Sborgi. 2008. ‘The Presidential and Parliamentary 
Elections in Mali, April and July, 2007’. Electoral Studies 27:740-773. 
Bernhagen, Patrick and Michael Marsh. 2007. The Partisan Effects of Low Turnout: 
Analyzing Vote Abstention as Missing Data Problem. Electoral Studies 26(2):401. 
Birch, Sarah. 2001. ‘Electoral Systems and Party System Stability in Post-Communist 
Europe’. Paper prepared for presentation at the 97th annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 30 –September 2, 2001. 
 
Birnir, Johanna K. 2006. Ethnicity and Electoral Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Bogaards, Matthijs. 2008. Dominant Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in 
Africa: A Comment on Mozaffar and Scarritt. Party Politics 14(1): 113-130. 
Bramble, Thomas and Franco. Barchiezi. (eds.). 2003. Rethinking the Labor 
Movement in the “New South Africa”. Ashgate Publishing Co. 
120 
 
Bratton, Michael,  Robert Mattes and Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi. 2005. Public 
Opinion, Democracy and Market Reform in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bratton, Michael and De Walle van N. 1997. Democratic Experience in Africa: 
Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspectives. New York: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Bratton, Michael, Robert Mattes, and Mwangi S. Kimenyi, 2008. ‘Voting in Kenya: 
Putting Ethnicity in Perspective. Afrobarometer Working Paper 95 (March). 
Brug, van der Wouter, Cees van der Eijik, and Mark Franklin. 2007. (eds.). The 
Economy and the Vote: Economic Conditions and Elections in Fifteen Countries. 
New York: Cambridge university press. 
 
Buhlungu, Sakhela, John Daniel, Roger Southall, and Jessica Lutchman. 2007.  
State of the Nation: South Africa 2007.HSRC Press. 
Carpini, MX Delli and Scott Keeter. 1997. What Americans Know About Politics 
and why it Matters. Chelsea, MI: Yale University Press. 
Carty, R. Kenneth, William Cross and Lisa Young. 2000. Rebuilding Canadian 
party politics. University of Washington Press. 
Chege, Michael. 2008. ‘Kenya: Back from the Brinks’. Journal of Democracy 
19(4):125-139 (October). 
Chua, Beng. H. 2007. Elections as Popular Culture in Asia. New York: Routledge. 
Clarke, A.B Paul and Joe Foweraker.eds. 2001. Encyclopedia of Democratic 
Thought. Taylor& Francis. 
Cohen, Louis, Lawrence Manion, and Keith Morrison. 2003. Research Methods in 
Education. Routledge. 
Cortana, Pietro .G .1999. Evaluation and Optimization of Electoral Systems. 
Philadelphia: SIAM. 
Cowen, Michael and Liisa Laakso. eds. 2002. Multiparty Elections in Africa. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Dalgaard, Peter. 2002. Statistics and Computing: Introductory Statistics with R. 
New York: Springer. 
121 
 
Dalton Russell, J. 2008. Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in 
Advanced Industrial Democracies. Washington DC: Congress Quarterly. 
Dorussen, Han and Michaell Taylor. (eds.) 2002. Economic Voting. London: 
Routledge. 
Dowd, Roberts A. and Michael Driessen. 2008. ‘Ethnically Dominated Party 
Systems and the Quality of Democracy: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa.’ 
Afrobarometer Working Paper 92. 
Downs, Anthony.  1957.  An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper 
and Row.  
Duch, Raymond M. and Randolph T Stevenson. 2008. The Economic Vote: How 
Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Easterly, W. and Levine, R. 1997. ‘Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic 
Divisions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 4:1203-1250. 
Edoho, Felix Moses. 1997. Globalization and the New World Order: Promises, 
Problems and Prospects for Africa in the 21st Century. Greenwood Publishing 
Group. 
Elections Institute of South Africa 2004. Election Update 2004 Botswana. No. 1 
(October). 
Elections Institute of South. Africa.2005. Election Update 2004, Botswana. No.3, 
17th January. 
Epperly, Brad. 2008-04-03. ‘Institutions and Legacies: Electoral Volatility in 
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union" Paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association Annual National Conference, 
Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL. 
Fair, Ray C. 2002. Predicting Presidential Elections and Other Things. Palo Alto, 
CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
Ferguson, Thomas. 1995. Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party 
Competition and the Logic of Money-driven Political System. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
 
Ferguson, Thomas and Rogers, Joel. 1984. The political Economy: Readings in the 




Fishkin, James S. and Laslett, Peter. 2003. Debating Deliberative Democracy. 
Ames, IA: Blackwell Publishing. 
Fowler, H. J. and O. Smirnov. 2007. Mandates, Parties, and Voters: How Elections 
Shape the Future. Philadelphia: Tempel University Press.  
Fox, John. 1999. Applied Regression Analysis, Linear Models, and Related 
Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Fox, John. 2002. Appendix to an R and S-PLUS Companion to Applied Regression 
(http://cran.r-project.org/doc/contrib/Fox-Companion/appendix.html) 
Freedom House. 2006. Freedom in the World 2006: The Annual Survey of Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties, 2006. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. 
______________2002. Freedom in the World 2002: The Annual Survey of Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties, 2001-2002. New York: Freedom House. 
Gierzynski, Anthony. 2000. Money Rules: Financing Elections in America. Boulder, 
CO.: Westview Press. 
Giliomee, Herman and Charles Simkins. 1999. The Awkward Embrace: One Party 
Domination and Democracy. Cape Town, South Africa: Tafelberg Press. 
Ginsberg, Benjamin and Allan Stone. (eds.). 1996. Do Elections Matter? New York: 
M.E Sharpe. 
Goidel, Robert K, Donald Gross A. and Todd Shields G. 1999. Money Matters: 
Consequences of Campaign Reform in US House Elections. Rowman & Littlefield. 
Goodwin-Gil, Guy. 2006. Free and Fair Elections: New Expanded Edition. Geneva: 
Inter-Parliamentary Union. 
Haq, Mahbub. 1995. Reflections on Human Development. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Haywood, Fred M. (ed.). 1987. Elections in Independent Africa. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press. 
Hirschbein, Ron. 1999. Voting Rites: The Devolution of American Politics. 
Greenwood Publishing Group. 
 
Hoyle, Rick H. 1999. Statistical Strategies for Small Sample Research.  Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage publications Ltd. 
123 
 
Horowitz, Donald L. 1983. ‘Racial violence in the United States’, in Ethnic 
Pluralism and Public Policy: Achieving Equality in the United States and Britain, 
edited by Nathan glazer and Ken Young. London: Heinemann. 
Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Hug, Simon. 2001. Altering Party Systems: Strategic Behavior and the Emergence 
of New Parties in Western Democracies. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 
Hueglin, Thomas O. and Allan Fenna. 2006. Comparative Federalism: A Systematic 
Inquiry .Toronto: Broadview Press. 
 
Institute for Education in Democracy. 1998. Understanding Elections in Kenya: A 
Constituency Profile Approach. Nairobi: Institute for Education in Democracy. 
Ishiyama, John. 2003. ‘Electoral Systems, Ethnic Fragmentation, and Party System 
Volatility in Sub-Saharan African countries’. Northeast African Studies 10(2):203-
220. 
Kasongo-Lumumba, Tukumbi. (ed.). 2005. Liberal Democracy and its Critics in 
Africa: Political Dysfunction and the Strength for Social Progress. Dakar: 
CODESRIA. 
Katz, Richard .S and William .J Crotty. 2006. Handbook of Party Politics. 
Key, Valdimier, O. 1961. Public Opinion and American Democracy. New York: 
Knopf Publishers.  
Key, Valdimier, O. 1966. The Responsible Electorate: Rationality on Presidential 
Voting 1936-1960. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University. 
Kinder, Donald, Steven Rosenstone, J. and Mark Hansen, J. 1983. ‘Group Economic 
Well Being and Political Choice.’ Pilot study report to the 1984 NES Planning 
Committee and NES Board. 
Kinder, Donald and R. Kiewiet. 1981. Sociotropic Politics: The American Case. 
British Journal of Political Science 11:129-161 (April). 
Koetble, T. A. 1991. The Left Unraveled: Social Democracy and the New Left 
Challenges in Britain and West Germany. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Kramer, Gerald H. 1971. ‘Short-Term Fluctuations in US Voting Behavior, 1896-
1964’.American Political Science Review 71(March). 
124 
 
Kramer, Gerald H. 1983. ‘The ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate versus 
Individual-level findings on Economics and Elections, and Sociotropic Voting’ 
American Political Science Review 77:92-111 
Kuenzi, Mitchell and Lambright, Gina. 2005. ‘Party Systems and Democratic 
Consolidation in Africa’s Electoral Regimes’. Party Politics 11, 4: 423-446. 
Kuzio, Taras. (ed.). 1998. Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet 
Transformation. New York: ME Sharpe 
Landman, Todd. 2008. Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An 
Introduction. New York: Routledge. 
Lane, Jan-Erik and Ersson, Svante. 1999. Politics and Society in Western Europe. 
London: Sage.  
Lechery, Neil. 1997. The Israeli Labor Party: In the Shadow of Likud. Berkshire: 
Garnet & Ithaca Press. 
LeDuc, Lawrence, Alfred Niemi and Pippa Norris. 2002. Comparing Democracies 
2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting. London: Sage Publications. 
Lemon, Jim and Ian Fellows. 2007. Concord Concordance and Reliability. R 
Package Version 1.4-9. http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/concord/index.html.  
Lewis, Peter. (eds.). 1998. Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change. Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press. 
Levy Brian and Sahr Kpundeh. (eds.). 2004. Building State Capacity in Africa: New 
Approaches, Emerging Lessons. Washington DC: World Bank. 
Liebenow, Gus J. 1986. African Politics: Crises and Challenges. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
Lindberg, Staphan. I. 2006. Democracy and Elections in Africa. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Lindberg, Staphan. I. and Minion K.C Morrison. 2008. ‘Are African Voters Really 
Ethnic or Clientelistic? Survey Evidence from Ghana’. Political Science Quarterly. 
123(1):95-122 
Lipset, Martin Seymour and Stein Rokhan. 1967. Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. Free Press. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 




Localizada, Autor N. (ed.). 2002. Regional Surveys of the World: Africa South of 
Sahara 2003. Routledge. 
Long David E. and Bernard Reich. (eds.) 2002.  The Government and Politics of the 
Middle East and North Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview press. 
Loucks, Orie L. 1998. Sustainability for Resources and Business. Boca Raton: 
Lewis Publishers. 
Madrid, Raul. 2005. Ethnic Cleavages and Electoral Volatility in Latin America. 
Comparative Politics 38(1):1-120 (October). 
Mainwaring, Scott. 1999. Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of 
Democracy: The Case of Brazil. California: Stanford University Press. 
Mainwaring, Scott and Scully, Timothy. R. 1995. Building Democratic Institutions: 
Party Systems in Latin America. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Mair, Peter. 1998. Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Mair, P, Wolfgang, C. M. and Plasser, F. 2004. Political Parties and Electoral 
Change: Party Responses to Electoral Markets. London: Sage Publishers. 
Manly, Bryan F.J. 1997. Randomization, Bootstrap and Monte Carlo methods in 
Biology.  CRC Press. 
Meyers, Lawrence S., Glenn Gamst and A.J Guriano. 2006.  Applied Multivariate 
Research: Design and Interpretation. London: Sage Publications. 
Morse, Stephen. 2004. Indices and Indicators in Development: An Unhealthy 
Obsession with Numbers? London: Earthscan Publishers. 
Mozaffar, Shaheen and Scarritt, James. R. 2005. ‘The Puzzle of African Party 
System’. Party Politics 11, 4: 399-421. 
Mueller, Dennis C. 2003. Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
press. 
Muthien, Yvonne. 1999. Democracy in South Africa: Evaluating the 1999 Election. 
Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council Press. 
Nachmias,  Chava, F and Anna, Guerrero L. 2006. Social Statistics for a Diverse 
Society. London: Sage Publications 
Ndegwa, Stephen S. 2001. A Decade of Democracy in Africa. Leid, Boston: Brill. 
126 
 
N’Diaye, Boubacar, Abdoulaye Saine and Mathurin Houngnikpo. 2005. Not Yet 
Democracy: West Africa’s Slow Farewell to Authoritarianism. Durham, NC: 
Carolina Academic Press. 
Norris, Pippa. (ed.). 1997. Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced 
Democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Norris, Pippa and Robert Mattes. 2003. Does Ethnicity Determine Support for the 
Governing Party? Afrobarometer Working Paper 26 available online at 
(http://www.afrobarometer.org/abseries.html) 
Ott, Martin, Bodo Immink, Bhatupe Mhango and Christian Peters-Berries. (eds.). 
2004. The power of the vote: Malawi’s 2004 Parliamentary and Presidential 
Elections. Zomba: Kachere Series. 
Paldam, Michael. 1981. A Preliminary Survey of the Theories and Findings on Vote 
and Popularity Functions. European Journal of Political Research. 9:181-199. 
Pedersen, N. Morgens. 1979. ‘The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing 
Patterns of Electoral Volatility’. European Journal of Political Research 7, 1:1-26 
Pennings, Paul. and Lane, Jan-Erik. 1998. Comparing Party System Change. 
London: Routledge. 
Pomper, Gerald. M. 1992. Voters, Elections and Parties: The Practice of 
Democratic Theory. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. 
Posner, Daniel. N. 2005. Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
_____________ 2004. “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa’. Journal of 
Political Science 48, 4:849-863 (October). 
Posner, Daniel N. and Simon David .J. 2002. ‘Economic Conditions and Incumbent 
Support in Africa’s New Democracies: Evidence from Zambia’s Comparative 
Political Studies. 35, 3:313-336 
Popkin, S. 1994. The Reasoning Voter: Communications and Persuasion in 
Presidential Campaigns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Popkin, S. Gorman, J.W.: Phillips, C. and Smith, J. A. 1976. ‘What have you done 
for me lately? Toward an Investment Theory of Voting’. American Political Science 
Review 70, 3. 
Reed, Steven and Brunk Gregory. 1984. ‘A Test of Two Theories of Economically 
Motivated Voting: The Case of Japan’. Comparative Studies 17(1):55-66(October). 
127 
 
Reynolds, Andrew. (ed.). 1999. Election ’99 South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki. 
New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Roberts, Kenneth M. and Eric Wibbels. 1999. ‘Party Systems and Electoral 
Volatility in Latin America: a Test of Economic, Institutional and Structural 
Explanations’. American Political Science Review. 93(3):575-590 (September) 
Rosema, Martin. 2007. ‘Low Run Out: Threat to Democracy or Blessing in 
Disguise? Consequences of Citizens’ Varying Tendencies to Vote.’ Electoral 
Studies 26(3): 612- 623 (September). 
Rosenof, Theodore. 2003. Realignments: The Theory that changed the way we think 
about American Politics. Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield Inc. Publications. 
Saine, Abdoulaye. 2008. ‘The Presidential Elections in the Gambia, October 2001’. 
Electoral Studies 22:325-395. 
Schaffer, Charles F. 2000. Democracy in Transition: Understanding Politics in an 
Unfamiliar Culture. New York: University of Cornell Press. 
Scheiner, Samuel and Jessica Gurevitch. (ed.). 2001. Design and Analysis of 
Ecological Experiments. New York: Oxford University Press 
Shah, Anwar. (ed.). 2007. Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series: 
Budgeting and budgetary Institutions. The World Bank  
Shapiro, Yonathan and Ralph Mandel. 1991. The Road to Power: Herut Party in 
Israel. Albany: Sunny Press. 
Sisk, Timothy D. and Reynolds, Arnold. 1998. Elections and Conflict Management 
in Africa. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press. 
Stack, John F. and Lui, Hebron. (eds.) 1999. The Ethnic Entanglement: Conflict and 
Intervention in World Politics. Oxford: Greenwood Publishing Group. 
Standard Chartered Bank. 2007. Global Perspectives: The World of Supply Chain 
Management and Logistics 2007/2008. Hong Kong: PPP Co. Ltd.  
Tavits, Margit. 2004. ‘New is better? Party System Change and Stability in Eastern 
Europe’. Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago IL. 
April 15-18. 
Tavits, Margit. 2005. ‘The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral 





Tavits, Margit. 2008. ‘On the linkage between Electoral Volatility and Party System 
Instability in Central and Eastern Europe’. European Journal of Political Research 
47(5):537-555. 
 
Teixeira, Ruy A. 1992. The Disappearing American Voter. Washington DC: The 
Brookings Institution. 
 
Thames, Frank S, Dennis Patterson P. and Joseph Robbins W. 2008. ‘The 
Institutional Causes of Electoral Volatility’. Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Political Science Association, August 27-31, Boston, MA. 
 
Tihany, Krisztina. 2006. Blending the Rainbow Nation: The Racial Integration of 
Schools and its Implications for Reconciliation in Post Apartheid South Africa. 
Lanham: Lexington Books. 
 
Tulchin, Joseph H. and Allison Garland M. eds. 1998. Argentina: The Challenges of 
Modernization. SR Books. Wimington, DE: Scholarly Resources. 
 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 2007. Measuring Human 
Development:  A Primer. New York: UNDP. 
___________________. 2006. Human Development Report 2006. Beyond Scarcity: 
Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Valenzuela, S.J and T.R Scully.1997. ‘Electoral Choices and the Party System in 
Chile: Continuities and Changes in the Recovery of Democracy’. Comparative 
Politics 29(4):511-527. 
Van, Cott Donna Lee. 2005. From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The 
Evolution of Ethnic Politics. 
 
Vowles, Jack, Peter Aimer Helena Catt, Jim Lamare and Raymond Miller. 1995.  
Towards Consensus? The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to 
Proportional Representation. Auckland University Press. 
 
Vowles Peter, J, Karp Aimer J, Banducci Susan and Sullivan Raymond M.A. 2002. 
Proportional Representation on Trial: The 1999 New General Zealand General 
Election and the Fate of MMP. Auckland: Auckland University Press. 
Vowles, Jack. 2004. Voters’ Veto: The 2002 Elections in New Zealand and the 




Walker, Jeffrey T. and Sean Maddan. 2009. Statistics in Criminology and Criminal 
Justice: Analysis and Interpretation. Mississauga, Ontario: Jones and Bartlett 
Publishers LLC. 
 
Warner, Rebecca M., 2008. Applied Statistics: From Bivariate through Multivariate 
Techniques. London: Sage Publications.  
Webb, Paul and Stephen White. (eds.). 2007. Party Politics in New Democracies. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Willet, Thomas, D. (eds.). 1988. Political Business Cycles: The Political Economy 
of Money, Inflation, and Unemployment. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Wheatley, Jonathan. 2005. Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: 
Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union. Burlington, VT: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd. 
White, H.; Killick T.; Kayizzi-Mugerwa, S. and Savane M. 2001. African Poverty at 
the Millennium: Causes, Complexities and Challenges. Washington DC: World 
Bank. 
World Bank 2003. Poverty and Inequality: Geographic Dimensions of Well Being in 
Kenya: Where are the Poor? http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSit 
e PK=477894& contentMDK=20382755&menuPK=546584&pagePK= 64168182 
&piPK=64168060 (07/07/09). 
 
Worshinsky, Oliver H. 2008. Explaining Politics: Culture, Institutions and Political 
Behavior. New York: Routledge.  
 
Wusu, Olufemi. (eds.). 2006. Politics and Economics of Africa vol.5 Nova 
Publishers. 
 
Youde, Jeremy. 2005. ‘Economics and Government Popularity in Ghana’. Electoral 
Studies. 24:1-16 
Zuckerman, Allan S. 2005. The Social Logic of Politics: Personal Networks as 










BBC News: Interviews with Gambian Voters 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/pop_ups/06/africa_voters_views_in_the_gamb
ia/html/1.stm Accessed on June 8, 2009). 
Internet Sources 
BBC News: Interviews with Zambian Voters 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7694953.stm#honest (04/03/09) 
Electoral Commission of Ghana: http://www.ec.gov.gh/ 
Electoral Commission of Kenya: http://www.eck.or.ke/index.php/Election-Results-
Database/ Accessed on July 8, 2009). 
Elections Institute of Southern Africa, 2005:  
http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/botswana.htm. 
Election Resources on the Internet: General Elections in the Republic of South 
Africa. http://electionresources.org/za/#ELECTIONS (04/07/09). 
Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa 
http://www.elections.org.za/Results/natperprov.asp (04/07/09). 
Malawi Electoral Commission:  
http://www.sdnp.org.mw/~solomon/mec/ (03/09/09) 
 
Ministry of information and communication (Kenya): 
http://www.information.go.ke/indexc.php?c2=129&c3=201%20&c4=545#place3 
(02/07/09) 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa: 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/index.php accessed 07/12/19) 
 
South Africa.info.                              
http://www.southafrica.info/about/people/popprov.htm (05/09/09) 









The European Union Observer Mission Report on Kenya’s 2002 Elections: 
http://aceproject.org/regions-en/ied/KE/reports/Kenya%20-%20EU%20rep02.pdf 
(02/08/09). 
















































Stellenbosch 19.7 0.74  69.1 3.7 -20.1 09.3 
Drakeinstein 20.6 0.70 70.1 0.1 -15.2 10.5 
Witzenberg 13.8 0.72 69.2 3.8 -25.3 10.6 




George 25.5 0.69 74.0 -2.6 -21.6 22.0 
Kannaland 26.5 0.66 71.6 -5.4 -12.7 16.5 
Knysna 18.9 0.69 81.1 -9.7 -08.0 11.0 
Mossel Bay  33.2 0.70 79.5 4.0 -29.3 26.1 
Oudtshoorn 31.4 0.69 66.3 -3.6 -22.8 13.9 
West 
Coast 
Cederberg 32.8 0.67 73.5 8.4 -26.4 19.0 





Bredersdorp 35.5 0.69 77.8 5.6 -32.5 24.7 
Overstrand 19.8 0.73 78.0 -2.3 -21.9 19.5 
Swellendam 28.2 0.72 75.6 5.2 -27.1 10.9 
Caledon 27.8 0.71 65.8 11.4 -26.0 3.9 
Central 
Karoo 
Lingsberg 36.4 0.68 77.1 13.1 -30.5 21.4 
Beafort West 33.1 0.64 79.7 14.8 -30.5 09.4 
Data Source: Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa; Western Cape Provincial 






























Benin 1999 2003 24.7 0.431 0.788 55.9 2.0F PR N 
 




1997 2002 39.6 0.302 0.480 64.1 4.0P PR N 
 
Cameroon 1997 2002 19.8 0.501 0.818 70.0 6.0N Mix N 
 
CA.R. 1998 2005 54.1 0.384 0.783 67.3 4.5P FPP Y 
 




1996 2000 48.1 0.402 0.742 31.5 5.5N FPP N 
 
Comoros  1996 2004 27.8 0.556 0.566 65.0 4.0P FPP N 
 
Djibouti 1999 2003 16.9 0.495 0.514 47.8 5.0P FPP N 
 




1999 2004 0.80 0.653 0.259 96.5 6.5N FPP N 
Gabon 1996 2001 10.6 0.653 0.690 44.0 4.5P FPP N 
 
Gambia 1998 2002 22.4 0.452 0.755 56.4 4.0P FPP N 
 
Ghana 2000 2004 07.0 0.567 0.744 85.0 2.0F FPP Y 
 
Guinea  1995 2002 18.4 0.425 0.700 71.6 5.5N Mix N 
 
Kenya 1997 2002 32.0 0.488 0.859 57.0 4.0P FPP Y 
 
Lesotho 1998 2002 32.9 0.493 0.006 66.7 2.5F Mix Y 
 
Malawi 1999 2004 38.1 0.400 0.649 59.8 4.0P FPP Y 
 
Mali 1997 2002 49.8 0.326 0.690 38.3 2.5F FPP N 
 
Mauritania  1996 2001 19.4 0.454 0.660 54.4 5.0P FPP N 
 





1. ELF values for Lesotho, Mauritius and South Africa are taken from Norris Pippa and 
Robert Mattes. 2003. Does Ethnicity Determine Support for the Governing Party? 
Afrobarometer Working Paper 26 (http://www.afrobarometer.org/abseries.html-02/05/09). 
2. Data Source: Freedom House. 2006. Freedom in the World 2006: the Annual Survey of 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties. New York: Rowman and Littlefield; UNDP. 2006. 
Human Development Report 2006. Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water 
Crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Parline database on national parliaments 
(http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp-02/25/09); Adam Carr’s Election Archives 
(http://psephos.adam-carr.net-02/24/09). Scarritt and Mozaffar Dataset on African Ethno-
political group fragmentation and Concentration (http://webhost.bridgew.edu/smozaffar-
02/20/09); African Elections database (http://africanelections.tripod.com-02/28/09); The 
Joshua project (http://www.joshuaproject.net/countries.php?rog3=CN-03/08/09); IDEA 
International: (http://www.idea.int/esd/world.cfm-02/24/09): CIA World Fact book 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ -02/13/09). 
3. EV = Electoral volatility; HDI = Human Development Index; ELF = Ethno-
Linguistic Fractionalization Index; VO = Voter Turn Out; FRE = Freedom; SY = 
Electoral System; C = Concurrent Presidential and parliamentary Elections; PR = 
List PR; FPP = First Past the Post; Mix = Mixed System; F = Free; N = Not Free; P 
= Partially Free; Y = Yes; N = No. 
 
Namibia 1999 2004 13.9 0.626 0.718
* 
84.8 2.5F PR Y 
 




1998 2002 12.9 0.645 0.330 66.3 1.5F PR N 









1999 2004 18.5 0.653 0.861 76.7 1.5F PR 
 
Y 
Tanzania 1995 2000 37.1 0.440 0.650 
* 
84.0 4.0P FPP Y 
Zambia 1996 2001 47.5 0.386 0.751
* 




2000 2005 14.1 0.513 0.307 47.7 6.5N FPP N  
Appendix 3: Data on Kenyan Provinces 
Province HDI Electoral 
Volatility 
Voter Turnout ELF 
Central 0.607 24.1 66.1 0.077 
Rift Valley 0.510 16.4 60.8 0.668 
Eastern 0.525 27.9 60.9 0.547 
North-
Eastern 
0.473 18.2 57.8 0.069 
Western 0.449 54.2 57.1 0.211 
Nyanza 0.440 31.3 55.6 0.503 
Coast 0.467 52.4 42.1 0.533 
Nairobi 0.758 00.0 42.0 0.704 
Data source: The European Union Observer Mission Report: (http://aceproject.org/regions-
en/ied/KE/reports/Kenya%20-%20EU%20rep02.pdf-02/08/09); The Third Kenya Human 
Development Report: http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/africa/kenya/ Kenya_ 
2003_en.pdf (02/08/09); Government of Kenya.1989 Kenya Population Census. University 









































14.6 78.9 0.564 28.6 8.2 3.0 
Gauteng 0.735 
 





17.9 73.5 0.337 28.7 7.7 0.3 
Limpopo 0.594 
 










8.1 89.3 0.499 24.4 1.3 5.8 
Northern 
Cape 




0.771 40.7 42.6 0.573 18.6 3.7 12.8 
 
Data Source: Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa; South Africa Human 
Development Report, 2003; South Africa.info; South Africa Labor Force Survey,  
September 2004,  cited in Statistics South Africa. 2006. Provincial Profile 2004: Free state. 
















Ainamoi 15.8 52 45 59.0 
Alego 26.3 62 68 50.6 
Amagoro  36.6 48 50 60.6 
Bonchari 35.8 62 74 58.3 
Budalangi 17.4 68 70 64.2 
Charangany 36.7 51 49 61.5 
Dagoretti  11.7 46 46 47.3 
Eldama Ravine  0.0 43 47 66.9 
Eldoret North 8.4 47 54 57.1 
Galole 25.5 62 42 53.5 
Gichugu 5.8 34 34 70.2 
Ikolomani 38.1 71 72 54.6 
Imenti North  18.2 44 44 65.1 
Kacheliba  6.6 47 47 46.2 
Kajiado South 4.1 50 50 60.7 
Kaloleni 38.8 73 74 42.7 
Kandara  27.1 36 36 65.3 
Kathiani  33.9 62 59 52.6 
Keiyo South  12.3 40 38 69.4 
Kilgoris 22.9 53 59 64.7 
Kisauni 18.4 47 46 33.2 
Kitui South 72.4 74 63 50.3 
Laikipia East  13.2 43 44 59.4 
Likoni  8.4 48 45 34.8 
Lugari 17.3 61 64 58.4 
Makadara 15.7 59 59 41.0 
Malindi 19.9 63 61 40.4 
Marakwet East 27.9 41 42 66.3 
Matungu 40.8 58 59 63.1 
Mbooni 19.0 67 65 57.6 
Molo 20.2 40 43 58.3 
Mt. Elgon 11.3 53 55 66.1 
Muhoroni  12.9 52 58 53.3 
Mwala 24.7 64 64 52.1 
Mwatate 25.1 58 59 49.3 
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Narok South 20.8 53 53 62.6 
Nyakach 17.9 61 64 57.8 
Olkalau 11.7 33 33 68.1 
Rongo 7.3 45 44 58.5 
Runyenjes 55.4 58 58 64.8 
Saku 15.7 45 46 73.3 
Sigor 32.4 54 53 59.8 
Sirisia 4.4 58 58 63.0 
Sotik  40.1 56 49 65.1 
Tharaka 44.7 63 63 73.1 
Tigania West 27.7 58 61 75.4 
Tinderet 29.9 57 56 62.9 
Turkana Central 46.6 72 64 52.9 
Uriri  42.0 49 49 58.5 
Vihiga 31.2 56 57 55.5 
Lagdera** 22.8 - 64 58.5 
Mandera East** 30.8 - 65 64.6 
Wajir West** 24.3 - 63 55.7 
 
Data Source: World Bank. 2003. Poverty and Inequality: Geographic Dimensions of Well 
Being in Kenya: Where are the Poor? (Volume I and II): http://go.worldbank.org/ 
Z1Q8HEQOE0 and http://www.cbs.go.ke/surveys/poverty/pdf/KenyaPovAtlasIIfinal 
2cl.pdf; The European Union Observer Mission Report: (http://aceproject.org/ regions-
en/ied/KE/reports/Kenya%20-%20EU%20rep02.pdf-02/08/09); Institute for Education in 
Democracy.1998. Understanding Elections in Kenya: A Constituency Profile Approach. 
Nairobi: Institute for Education in Democracy. 
*Poverty Incidence I is based on volume I and Poverty Incidence II is based on volume II of 
the World Bank (2003). 
**constituencies marked with asterisk are from North-Eastern Province. Since volume I of 
the World Bank (2003) did not have data for the province, the three selected constituencies 









Appendix 6: Revised Kenya Constituency-Level Analysis 
The analysis in section 4.3 is based on poverty incidence data derived from World 
Bank. 2003. Poverty and Inequality: Geographic Dimensions of Well Being in 
Kenya: Where are the Poor? (Vol. I; Chapter 5) (http://go.worldbank.org/Z1Q8HEQ 
OE0). The data is aggregated at administrative levels, like Divisions, and not at the 
constituency-level. I therefore, relied on personal knowledge of the country to 
determine constituency poverty incidence from the Division-level data. In this 
regard, I selected Divisions which, in my judgment, constitute a given constituency, 
and used their rural poverty incidence averages as the poverty incidence for that 
particular constituency. At the same time, Volume I lacks data for North-Eastern 
Province and therefore I omitted the province from my analysis.  
However, in the final stages of preparing the paper, I accessed Volume II of the 
same document (http://www.cbs.go.ke/surveys/poverty/pdf/KenyaPovAtlasIIfinal 
2cl.pdf - table 1). It has data for North Eastern province as well as constituency-
level poverty incidence data for all the 210 Kenyan constituencies. The two volumes 
are hosted by different websites. I first performed the test of difference of means to 
check whether the two sets of data have significantly different means for the 
constituencies I had selected. The Paired t-test results are: t = 0.120, df = 49, p-
value = 0.905, the 95% confidence interval for the test ranges from -1.263 to 1.423. 
The mean poverty incidence from volume I data is 53.94, while from volume II data 
is 53.86. In effect, the mean of the differences is 0.08, which is not statistically 
significant given p-value = .905 > α = .05. This means that the difference between 
the poverty incidence scores in volume I and II are not statistically significant. 
using volume II data, I ran two robust regression models. Model 1 replicated the 
analysis presented in table 4 using poverty incidence data from volume II data. This 
was necessary because the analysis presented in table 4 is based on rural poverty 
incidence only, while the volume II data has general poverty incidence scores for 
each constituency. In Model 2, I added 3 constituencies from North-Eastern 
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Province (the last three constituencies in Appendix 5), since module I had no data 
for the province. The results of the two models are presented below: 
 
Table 7: Robust Regression of Constituency-Level Electoral Volatility in Kenya  
                                                Model 1                     Model 2    
 
Poverty Incidence                    0.570 *                        0.549 *   
                                                 (0.186)                        (0.173)      
                                                 [3.064]                        [3.167]                                                                                        
Voter Turnout                           0.188                          0.188    
                                                 (0.204)                        (0.194)      
                                                 [0.922]                        [0.967]                                                               
Intercept                                  -18.378                       -17.500                                       
                                                (17.262)                      (16.251)     
                                                [-1.065]                       [-1.077]                                                                                 
Residual Standard Error           13.42                          12.66                                                                                             
N                                                 50                               53        
 
*significant at 95% confidence level.  
The standard error for each variable is in parenthesis, while the t-scores are in the brackets. 
 
The results are substantively the same as those in table 4, and hence do not need re- 
interpretation. It is clear that volume I and II data yield more or less similar results. 
 
